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The conventional approach to comparing tax progression (using local measures, global measures 
or dominance relations for first moment distribution functions) often lacks applicability to the real 
world: local measures of tax progression have the disadvantage of ignoring the income distribution 
entirely. Global measures are affected by the drawback of all aggregation, viz. ignoring structural 
differences between the objects to be compared. Dominance relations of comparing tax 
progression depend heavily on the assumption that the same income distribution holds for both 
situations to be compared, which renders this approach impossible for international and 
intertemporal comparisons. Based on the earlier work of one of the authors, this paper develops a 
unified methodology to compare tax progression for dominance relations under different income 
distributions. We address it as uniform tax progression for different income distributions and 
present the respective approach for both continuous and discrete cases, the latter also being 
employed for empirical investigations. Using dominance relations, we define tax progression under 
different income distributions as a class of natural extensions of uniform tax progression in terms 
of taxes, net incomes, and differences of first moment distribution functions. To cope with 
different monetary units and different supports of the income distributions involved, we utilized 
their transformations to population and income quantiles. Altogether, we applied six methods of 
comparing tax progression, three in terms of taxes and three in terms of net incomes, which we 
utilized for empirical analyses of comparisons of tax progression using data from the Luxembourg 
Income Study. This is the first paper that performs international and intertemporal comparisons of 
uniform tax progression with actual data. For our analysis we chose those countries for which LIS 
disposes of data on gross incomes, taxes, payroll taxes and net incomes. This pertains to 15 
countries, out of which we selected 13. This gave rise to 78 international comparisons, which we 
carried out for household data, equivalized data, direct taxes and direct taxes inclusive of payroll 
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taxes. In total we investigated 312 international comparisons for each of the six methods of 
comparing tax progression. In two thirds of all cases we observed uniformly greater tax 
progression for international comparisons. In a bit more than one fifth of all cases we observed 
bifurcate tax progression, that is, progression is higher for one country up to some population or 
income quantile threshold, beyond which the situation is the opposite, i.e., progression is higher 
for the second country. No clear-cut findings can be reported for just one tenth of all cases. But 
even in these cases some curve differences are so small that they may well be ignored. We also test 
consistency of our results with regard to the six methods of comparing tax progression and present 
here twelve (Germany, the UK and the US) plus four comparing Germany and Sweden out of the 
total of 312 graphs, each containing six differences of first moment distribution functions. These 
differences can be interpreted as intensity of greater tax progression. We demonstrate the overall 
picture of uniform tax progression for international comparisons using Hasse diagrams.Concerning 
intertemporal comparisons of tax progression, we present the results for the US, the UK, and 
Germany for several time periods. We align our findings with respect to major political eras in 
these countries, e.g., G. Bush senior, W. Clinton, and G. Bush junior for the United States; M. 
Thatcher, J. Major, and A. Blair for the United Kingdom, and for Germany, the last year before 
German re-unification (1989), the beginning of H. Kohl’s last term as chancellor (1994), and G. 
Schröder (2000). In addition, we study sensitivity of our results to the equivalence scale parameter.  
 
Keywords: income tax progression, measurement of uniform tax progression, comparisons of tax 
progression, tax progression with different income distributions. 




Tax progression has ever been of concern, not only to the profession, but also to politi-
cians, let alone to the man on the street. Hence, measurement of tax progression and
international as well as intertemporal comparisons of tax progression are of utmost im-
portance. Intuitively, by tax progression we mean a situation when, as income increases,
so does the average tax rate, i.e., the higher income strata pay a relatively larger share of
their gross income than the lower income strata do. If we take the tax system as a whole,
then in addition to the tax schedule we should also take into account the inﬂuence of
the existing income distribution in order to be able to draw sound conclusions about its
real progression. Thus, we agree with Suits (1977, p. 725): “There is nothing inherently
regressive about a sales tax or even a poll tax. They are regressive because income is
unequally distributed, and the more unequally income is distributed, the more regressive
they become.”
In contrast to that, the existing methodology of measuring and comparing tax pro-
gression allows only answers to problems which are outside central interest. There are
three main routes of research, viz. local, global, and uniform measures of tax progression.
Local measures of tax progression, in particular its main representatives, tax revenue elas-
ticity and residual income elasticity, concentrate on the tax schedule only and neglect the
important role of the income distribution for tax progression. If a certain tax schedule
happens to be rather progressive but hits very few people only, then the respective tax
system should not be viewed as highly progressive. Global measures of tax progression
weigh taxation or the net incomes by the income distribution in addition to some other
weights, but this very aggregation procedure is its main drawback. A tax schedule which
is regressive over some income intervals may be categorized to be more progressive than
another tax schedule which is progressive throughout just because of compensation due
to the aggregation procedure. Uniform measures of tax progression which work by way
of single-crossing conditions or by relative concentration curves require the same income
distributions for all cases to be compared. This means that questions such as “Is the tax
schedule of the USA associated with the American income distribution more or less pro-
gressive than the German tax schedule associated with the German income distribution?”
cannot be answered by using this approach.
To handle these realistic problems, Seidl (1994) developed an approach in which com-
parisons are based on population quantiles or income quantiles with respect to taxes or
net incomes rather than on tax schedules directly in terms of income. This method allows
to substitute the income distributions with diﬀerent supports by quantiles with the unit
interval as the common support of diﬀerent distributions. The idea of this approach is
the following: if a tax schedule for one country collects relatively less tax revenue from
the lower income strata than does a tax schedule of another country, then the ﬁrst one
is considered as more progressive. Alternatively, if the ﬁrst tax schedule leaves the lower
income strata relatively more net income than does the tax schedule of another country,
1then the ﬁrst tax schedule is considered as more progressive. The comparison of these
relative positions is carried out in terms of the tax quantiles for the population quantiles
or for the income quantiles.1 In his theoretical work, Seidl (1994) made use of concavity
or convexity conditions of relative concentration curves, which, however, yielded only suf-
ﬁcient conditions in terms of elasticities, but not necessary conditions of uniformly more
or less tax progression. It seems that no general analytic solution to this problem exists.2
The main purpose of this paper is an empirical investigation of international and
intertemporal comparisons of tax progression utilizing this approach. We used data from
the Luxembourg Income Study, LIS (2010), for 13 out of 15 countries for which data for
gross incomes, direct taxes, payroll taxes and net incomes are available (see Table 1 in
Section 4.1). We made separate comparisons for household incomes and for equivalized
incomes (using the Luxembourg equivalence scale) and for progression of direct taxes
and direct taxes plus payroll taxes (mainly comprising the employees’ share of social
security contributions). This gave us four times 78 international comparisons. Moreover,
we applied six measurement devices for comparisons of tax progression, four in terms of
population quantiles and two in terms of income quantiles. In addition to that, we also
investigated intertemporal comparisons of tax progression for some selected countries and
studied the inﬂuence of the scale parameter of the Luxembourg equivalence scales on the
results of comparisons of tax progression.
Section 2 reviews local and global measures of tax progression, Section 3 deals with
uniform tax progression, ﬁrst for identical income distributions (or, more generally, for
income distributions with the same support), which represents the customary theory,
second for diﬀerent income distributions in the continuous version, and third for diﬀerent
income distributions in the discrete version in preparation for empirical investigations.
Section 4 displays the results of our research. This section section starts with a descrip-
tion of LIS data and the procedures we applied to them; it continues by providing some
intuition about working with grouped data, and then proceeds with an elaborate discus-
sion of the results of our research. Except for one table and two ﬁgures, all tables and
ﬁgures are placed at the end of the paper.
1Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) took a diﬀerent route: rather than replacing incomes by quantiles,
they transplanted the income distributions by deformation functions (p. 102), thereby remaining in the
domain of incomes. For instance, when comparing the United States with Germany, they propose de-
forming the German income distribution to the American income distribution and look whether the
American tax system, when applied to the deformed compound distribution, is more or less progressive
than the American tax system as applied to the American income distribution. Alternatively, the Amer-
ican income distribution can be deformed to the German income distribution, or both distributions can
be deformed to a ﬁctive third income distribution.
2Note that by a “general analytic solution” we mean the one that yields non-trivial necessary and
suﬃcient conditions. For instance, it is immediate that there is uniformly greater progression if and
only if the curve obtained by taking the diﬀerences of the transformed ﬁrst moment curves of taxes
or net incomes does not change its sign within the unit interval. This condition, however, is a mere
reformulation of the deﬁnition of uniform tax progression (see Section 3.3).
22 Local and Global Measures of Tax Progression
This paper employs the following notation: Y denotes income, [Y;Y ] denotes the sup-
port of the income distribution, f(Y )  0 denotes the density function and F(Y ) the
distribution function of the income distribution, q denotes the population quantiles and
p the income quantiles of gross incomes,  :=
R Y 
Y Y f(Y )dY denotes mean gross income,
T(Y ) denotes the income tax schedule,
T(Y )
Y denotes the average income tax schedule,
dT(Y )
dY denotes the marginal income tax schedule,3 and  :=
R Y 
Y T(Y )f(Y )dY denotes
mean tax.
Local measures of income tax progression just focus on the tax schedule. The more
primitive ones are the ﬁrst derivative of the average tax schedule and the diﬀerence of the
marginal and the average tax schedules. They are positive for progressive and negative




and the residual income elasticity
(Y ) :=
d[Y   T(Y )]=dY
[Y   T(Y )]=Y
:
Verbally expressed, the tax elasticity is the ratio of marginal and average tax rates,
and the residual income elasticity is the ratio of the marginal and the average retention
rates. "(y) measures liability progression, (y) residual income progression. According to
liability progression, a tax schedule is progressive at ~ Y if "(~ Y ) > 1; according to residual
income progression a tax schedule is progressive at ~ Y if 0 < (~ Y ) < 1. The meaning of
these two local measures of tax progression is simple: "(~ Y ) > 1 means that the tax on an
extra monetary unit for a taxpayer with income ~ Y exceeds his or her average tax burden;
0 < (~ Y ) < 1 means that an extra monetary unit leaves a taxpayer less net income than
under his or her average retention rate. Note that both measures are equivalent for the
general diagnosis of tax progression, that is, we have "(~ Y ) > 1 , 0 < (~ Y ) < 1, but
this equivalence does not apply to comparisons of tax progression. This means that for
two tax schedules T 1(Y ) and T 2(Y ) it does not follow that "1(~ Y ) > "2(~ Y ) holds if and
only if 1(~ Y ) < 2(~ Y ) holds. For a numerical illustration on a former German income
tax reform see Seidl and Kaletha (1987).
Local measures of tax progression have a crucial drawback: they are completely sep-
arated from income distributions. Hence, the fractions of people aﬀected by the various
parts of a tax schedule are neglected by local measures of tax progression. Yet for com-
paring two situations with respect to tax progression on the whole, the fractions of the
population aﬀected by the various parts of a tax schedule are important. Suppose that a
3For the sake of mathematical convenience we assume that all tax schedules are continuously diﬀer-
entiable.
3tax schedule is very progressive, yet nobody in a society is aﬀected by the very high rates
of this tax schedule. Then this tax schedule will be perceived as less progressive than a
tax schedule with more moderate rates which, however, cut in broad strata of taxpayers.
For an arbitrary income distribution (but which is assumed to be the same for both
schedules under comparison) we can employ local measures of tax progression for purposes
of progression comparison if we have dominance relationships throughout, e.g., "1(Y ) >
"2(Y ) or 1(Y ) < 2(Y ) for all Y 2 [Y;Y ]. If these relationships apply, then greater
tax progression of tax schedules holds trivially for any such income distribution on which
both tax schedules operate, and is therefore independent of the choice of the income
distribution. We will see below that similar relations represent suﬃcient conditions for
greater tax progression for uniform tax progression. Note that they may, although more
complicated, also be expressed in terms of q and p; we will come to these expressions
below.
The introduction of income distributions into comparisons of tax progression can be
done in two ways: the ﬁrst one takes the route of aggregate measures which map taxes
and incomes into the real numbers—these are global measures of tax progression; the
second one uses dominance relations—these are measures of uniform tax progression.
Global measures of tax progression are based on income distribution measures of
gross incomes, net incomes, and taxes.4 In the simplest cases the Gini coeﬃcient is used.
Examples include, inter alia, the measure proposed by Dalton (1922/1954, pp. 107-8) as
the mean deviation of average tax rates (which is just the Gini coeﬃcient of the average
tax rates), or the measure proposed by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), which is simply
the diﬀerence of the Gini coeﬃcients of net and gross incomes. Pechman and Okner
(1974) and Okner (1975) proposed to normalize the Reynolds-Smolensky measure by the
Gini coeﬃcient of gross incomes. The Musgrave and Thin (1948) measure of eﬀective
progression is the ratio of the areas under the Lorenz curves for gross and net incomes.5
Many more global measures of tax progression were developed, e.g., by Hainsworth (1984),
Khetan and Poddar (1976), Suits (1977), Kakwani (1977b, 1984, 1987), Formby et al.
(1981, 1984), Pfähler (1982, 1983, 1987), Liu (1984), and Lambert (1988). Blackorby and
Donaldson (1984) and Kiefer (1984, pp. 500-1) chose another way: they proposed global
measures of tax progression based on the equally distributed equivalent income.
Pfähler (1987, p. 7), suggested a general framework for global measures of tax pro-
gression. He showed that most of the measures based on distributional measures can
4For short surveys see Kiefer (1984, pp. 498-9), Seidl (1994, pp. 343-6), and Peichl and Schäfer (2008,
pp. 3-5). Kiefer (1984, p. 497) distinguished two groups of global measures of tax progression, viz.
structural indices, which are functions of incomes and their respective taxes, and distributional indices,
which are functions of the tax structure and the distribution of post-tax incomes. If this classiﬁcation
is extended to measures of uniform tax progression, then our Deﬁnitions 1, 2, and 5 in Section 3.3 are
structural measures of tax progression, and Deﬁnitions 3, 4, and 6 are distributional measures of tax
progression.
5The area under the Lorenz curve is one minus the Gini coeﬃcient divided by two.
4be expressed as the weighted sum of local relative deviations [T(Y )   
Y ]= of the
actual tax schedule from a revenue-neutral proportional tax schedule. For the expres-
sion of the global progression measures in terms of diﬀerences between the distribu-
tions of net incomes and gross incomes, Pfähler (1987, p. 12) showed that they can be
deﬁned using the very same weights for the weighted sum of local relative deviations
[Y   T(Y )   (1   
)Y ]=(   ) of actual net incomes from revenue-neutral net incomes
under a proportional tax.6
Global measures of tax progression not only serve to categorize tax schedules into
progressive, proportional and regressive, but also to derive an ordering of tax progression.
If progression is measured in terms of positive (negative) values, then tax schedule T 1()
is more progressive than T 2() if the global measure applied shows a higher (lower) value
for T 1() than for T 2().
Global measures of tax progression have several advantages. First, they work for
diﬀerent tax schedules and diﬀerent income distributions. This means that international
and intertemporal comparisons of tax progression can be eﬀectuated. Second, they feature
a double weighting, both by some weights particular to the speciﬁc global measure, and
by the income distribution. That is, particular characteristics of a tax schedule gain
more (less) weight if more (less) taxpayers are aﬀected. Third, global measures of tax
progression are able to compensate income subintervals with opposite properties of tax
schedules by appropriate weighting and subsequent aggregation.
However, at the same time this last advantage turns out as a major handicap of
global measures of tax progression. Aggregating the eﬀects of tax schedules over the
whole support of the income distribution may lead to the result that T 1() is categorized
as being more progressive than T 2(), although T 1() has a decreasing average tax rate
throughout some subinterval of the income support, while T 2()’s average tax schedule
is increasing throughout the whole income support. Alternatively, suppose that a tax
schedule is progressive for the lower incomes and regressive for the upper incomes. This
may lead to a Lorenz curve of gross incomes which intersects the Lorenz curve of net
incomes. In this case we cannot exclude that the two Gini coeﬃcients have the same
value (or that their diﬀerence is very small), which would indicate a proportional (or
close to proportional) tax schedule under some measures of tax progression, although this
tax schedule is far from being proportional (see also Suits (1977, p. 752) for a critique
of global measures of tax progression). The second handicap of global measures of tax
progression is rooted in their aggregation procedure, which presupposes comparability
of the tax burden across all income strata. This is much related to the assumption of
interpersonal comparability of utility. These handicaps led to the development of uniform
measures of tax progression which we consider in the next section.
6Using appropriate weighting functions, this approach encompasses many global measures of tax
progression, e.g., as proposed by Musgrave and Thin (1948), Hainsworth (1984), Khetan and Poddar
(1976), Suits (1977), Kakwani (1977b, 1984, 1987), Pfähler (1987), and Lambert (1988).
53 Uniform Tax Progression
Uniform tax progression adopts yet another concept of progression comparisons. Again,
it can be formulated in terms of taxes or in terms of net incomes. For the presentation
in this paper we shall stick to their original formulations.
3.1 Uniform Tax Progression for Income Distributions with the
Same Support
The main work on uniform tax progression was done under the assumption of identical
income distributions for the two tax schedules to be compared. It is immediate that the
respective analyses extend to income distributions with the same support.
Jakobsson (1976, p. 165) used elasticity properties of tax schedules to characterize
more progressive tax schedules. His theorem purports that if T 1() is more progressive
than T 2() for all possible income distributions with the same support [Y;Y ], then
1(Y )  2(Y ) for all Y 2 [Y;Y ] and 1(Y ) < 2(Y ) for a nonempty subinterval of
[Y;Y ] (the necessary condition). On the other hand, if for a particular pair of income
distributions with the same support [Y;Y ], 1(Y )  2(Y ) for all Y 2 [Y;Y ] and
1(Y ) < 2(Y ) for a nonempty subinterval of [Y;Y ], then T 1() is more progressive
than T 2() (the suﬃcient condition). The key diﬀerence between the necessary and the
suﬃcient conditions of greater tax progression lies in the fact that the latter can be
applied to some given pair of income distributions, while the former is applicable only if
all possible income distributions are considered.
As concerns the proof, the suﬃciency part of this theorem is obvious; it follows imme-
diately from the properties of residual income progression (see its deﬁnition in Section 2).
For the necessity part of this theorem, Jakobsson (1976, p. 165) considered the case that
1(Y )  2(Y ) holds generally, except for an income subinterval for which 1(Y ) > 2(Y )
holds. Then T 1() cannot be more progressive than T 2() because “we could always choose
an income distribution before tax that lies completely within the latter interval.” For this
latter interval, the tax schedule T 2() is more progressive than T 1().
Notice that if 1(Y ) < 2(Y ) holds for all Y 2 [Y;Y ], then T 1() generates syste-
matically lower net incomes than T 2() if the same income distribution holds for both
tax schedules. This means that T 1() raises more revenue than T 2(). In other words,
Jakobsson’s theorem is inconsistent with the assumption that T 1() and T 2() can raise
the same revenue. T 1(), it is true, causes a more equal distribution of net incomes than
T 2(), however bought at the price of a higher tax burden for all. The lower income strata
are only left with the satisfaction that the upper income strata are pinched relatively more
under the tax schedule T 1().
Kakwani (1977a), too, relied on elasticities for progression comparisons, but took
another route. His point of departure are the ﬁrst-moment distribution functions of
6taxes and net incomes:












These functions indicate the share of total tax revenue (total net income) paid (received)
by the income recipients with gross incomes less or equal to Y .
For two tax schedules Kakwani (1977a) employed the concentration curve of FT1(Y )
relative to FT2(Y ), and analogously for the net incomes. This relative concentration curve
is deﬁned on the unit square [note that the range of both FT(Y ) and FY  T(Y ) is the unit
interval], where FT1(Y ) is depicted on the ordinate and FT2(Y ) on the abscissa. If this
relative concentration curve lies below the diagonal, then, except at the endpoints Y and
Y , FT1(Y ) collects for all income levels Y a lower share of tax revenue than does FT2(Y ).
Hence, FT1() is more progressive than FT2().
The second derivative of a strictly convex (concave) function is positive (negative).
For a positive second derivative of the relative concentration curve of taxes "1(Y )  "2(Y )
holds, for a negative second derivative of the relative concentration curve of net incomes
1(Y )  2(Y ) holds. Alas, these conditions are suﬃcient conditions for greater tax
progression, but not necessary conditions. This results from Kakwani’s conﬁnement to a
particular income distribution rather than to the universe of all income distributions. A
particular income distribution and two tax schedules may yield a relative concentration
curve lying wholly below the diagonal, although "1(Y ) < "2(Y ) holds for some subinterval
of the support of the income distribution. This applies mutatis mutandis also to net
incomes. After all, this case seems to us the more realistic one because one wants to
compare tax schedules not with respect to the universe of income distributions, but for
an empirically given pair of income distributions.
A third approach developed by Hemming and Keen (1983) relies on single crossing
conditions. According to their ﬁndings, T 1() is more progressive than T 2() if the net
income function Y   T 1(Y ) crosses the net income function resulting from T 2(), viz.
Y  T 2(Y ), once from below, say, at ~ Y . In their proof, they start demonstrating that this
holds for tax schedules raising the same revenue. The intuition behind this proposition
is clear: tax progression means that the lower income strata pay relatively less than the
upper income strata under T 1() than under T 2(). In other words, the lower income
strata have relatively more net income than the upper income strata under T 1() than
under T 2(). By the assumption of revenue-neutral tax schedules, this translates into
absolute ﬁgures. Due to revenue neutrality, the upper income strata have to pay exactly
the same amount of tax more under T 1() than under T 2(), as the lower income strata
pay more under T 2() than under T 1(). If T 1() and T 2() are not revenue neutral, then
7the two cases have to be normalized and the argument translates into relative ﬁgures.
This is Hemming and Keen’s (1983) second proposition.
Obviously, this constitutes a suﬃcient condition of greater tax progression. The neces-
sary part of the proof comes from Hemming and Keen’s (1983) requirement that it should
hold for all income distributions. Suppose, for instance, that there are two crossings: let
Y   T 1(Y ) cross Y   T 2(Y ) at ~ Y > Y from below and at  Y ; Y  >  Y > ~ Y , from above.
Consider now ^ Y ;  Y > ^ Y > ~ Y . Then there exist income distributions such that T 1()
and T 2() raise the same revenue for Y 2 [Y; ^ Y ) and raise the same revenue (possibly
diﬀerent from the ﬁrst interval) for Y 2 [^ Y ;Y ]. Then T 1() is more progressive than
T 2() on the income interval [Y; ^ Y ) and less progressive on [^ Y ;Y ]. Hence, the necessary
part of the proof requires that the single-crossing condition should hold for the universe
of income distributions.
The relationship between Kakwani’s (1977a) elasticity condition and Hemming and
Keen’s (1983) single-crossing condition is the following: obviously
(3) ln
Y   T 1(Y )
Y   T 2(Y )
= ln[Y   T
1(Y )]   ln[Y   T
2(Y )]:
Diﬀerentiating this with respect to Y , multiplying the right-hand side by Y
Y , re-arranging





1(Y )]   ln[Y   T
2(Y )]g =
1(Y )   2(Y )
Y
:
Applying an exponential transformation on Equation (3) and substituting the integral of
Equation (4) yields
(5)
Y   T 1(Y )






for ~ Y  Y  Y , where ~ Y denotes the income at which the net income curves cross.
When 1(Y )  2(Y ) for all Y > ~ Y and the inequality sign is strict for some nonempty
interval of (~ Y ;Y ], then [Y  T 1(Y )] < [Y  T 2(Y )] for all y 2 (~ Y ;Y ]. In other words, the
single-crossing condition holds. Hence, the condition 1(Y )  2(Y ) for all Y 2 [Y;Y ]
is suﬃcient for the single-crossing condition to hold. Conversely, when the single-crossing
condition holds, this does not imply that 1(Y )  2(Y ) for all Y 2 [Y;Y ]. 1(Y ) >
2(Y ) may well hold for a subinterval of [Y; ~ Y ), or for a subinterval of (~ Y ;Y ], while
leaving the integral term in equation (5) negative.
Uniform measures of tax progression for identical income distributions, or, more gen-
erally, for income distributions with the same support, have several drawbacks. First,
by deﬁnition, they are only applicable for comparing tax schedules in situations with
the same income distributions or at least the same support of the income distributions.
Hence, they cannot be used for international or intertemporal comparisons of tax pro-
gression which are typically associated with diﬀerent income distributions and diﬀerent
8supports. Second, uniform measures of tax progression establish just suﬃcient condi-
tions of greater tax progression if considered not for all possible income distributions,
but for particular ones.7 It is, in particular, the ﬁrst drawback which suggests an ex-
tension to comparisons of progression for tax schedules associated with diﬀerent income
distributions having diﬀerent supports.
3.2 Uniform Tax Progression for Diﬀerent Income Distributions:
Continuous Version
The analysis of comparisons of uniform tax progression with diﬀerent income distributions
can be performed in terms of relative concentration curves of ﬁrst moment distribution
functions or in terms of ﬁrst- or second-order diﬀerences of ﬁrst moment distribution
functions. Note, at the outset, that ﬁrst moment distribution function of the shape (1)
or (2) are inappropriate for comparisons of tax progression of diﬀerent tax schedules
associated with diﬀerent income distributions. The reason is that this analysis holds only
if both income distributions have equal support, which is extremely unlikely. For two
functions of type (1) unequal support means that 1 = FT1(~ Y ) > FT2(~ Y ), where ~ Y is
equal to the maximum income Y 1 for the ﬁrst income distribution, but smaller than the
maximum income Y 2 for the second income distribution. This means that a relative
concentration curve starts at the point (0,0), but does not reach the point (1,1). Thus,
it is a degenerate relative concentration curve which cannot be used for comparisons of
tax progression.
Instead, we have to apply transformations from the income distributions on [Y1;Y 1]
and [Y2;Y 2], respectively, onto the unit interval. Several methods are available. Two
of them stand out, viz. the expression in terms of population quantiles q = F(Y ), and
in terms of income quantiles p = FY(Y ) = 1

R Y
Y yf(y)dy: q indicates the fraction of the
persons in the lower income strata with maximum income Y ; p indicates the fraction of
the aggregate income of the lower income strata with maximum income Y .8 Obviously
F(Y ) > FY(Y ) because every person with income less or equal to Y is counted by F(Y )
with the same population weight, whereas FY(Y ) counts the smallest incomes up to
Y and expresses their aggregate as a fraction of total income, because smaller incomes
contribute less weight. Conversely, F  1(q) < F
 1
Y (p) for q = p because the (q  100)
percent lowest income earners have a lower maximum income than the maximum income
of the (q  100) = (p  100) percent of aggregate income.
A simple transformation of variables Y = F  1(q) applied to the ﬁrst moment distri-
7On the other hand, Kakwani’s (1977a) suﬃciency conditions extend to necessary conditions if they
should apply to the universe of income distributions.
8Note the this approach has also the advantage that the eﬀects of inﬂation for intertemporal com-
parisons of tax progression are normalized by population or income shares. At the same time, diﬀerent
currencies are also calibrated and uniﬁed by this approach, which renders international comparisons of
tax progression viable.
9bution function of incomes, FY(Y ) = 1

R Y
Y yf(y)dy, and to the ﬁrst moment distribution
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where the expression under the integral in equation (9) is the average tax schedule, and
in equation (10) it is the average retention schedule.
Note that FY(q) is the Lorenz curve of the gross income distribution, FT(q) is the
Lorenz curve of the tax distribution, and FY  T(q) is the Lorenz curve of the net income
distribution.10 F Y
T (p) denotes the fraction of total tax revenue paid by all taxpayers
whose aggregate gross income amounts to the fraction p of total gross income. F Y
Y  T(p)
denotes the fraction of aggregate net income of all taxpayers whose aggregate gross income
amounts to the fraction p of total gross income. Notice the diﬀerence between FT(q) and
F Y
T (p): FT(q) denotes the share of total tax revenue paid by the fraction q of the poorest
taxpayers, whereas F Y
T (p) denotes the share of total tax revenue paid by the poorest
taxpayers whose compound gross income is a fraction p of total gross income. This
means that we have FT(q) < F Y
T (p) for any given unequal income distribution and for
any strictly increasing average tax schedule T(Y )=Y , if 1 > q = p > 0, because the
fraction q of the poorest taxpayers holds only a fraction of total gross income, FY(q),
which is smaller than F Y
Y (p) = p for q = p.
Next, we deﬁne uniformly greater progression of tax schedules associated with their
respective income distributions. This can be done in at least two ways. Firstly, a tax
9Equations (9) and (14) (the latter for the discrete case) are the so-called Suits (1977) curves. Suits
used the tax curve to construct a global measure of tax progression similarly to the Gini coeﬃcient for
measuring income inequality. Note that FY
Y (p) is just the diagonal through the unit square. Therefore,
this formulation is omitted.
10This means that we assume away re-ranking in our theoretical analysis. We will come back to this
point in the next section.
10Figure 1: Construction of a relative concentration curve from Lorenz curves for taxes
schedule T 1 can be deﬁned to be uniformly more progressive than T 2 whenever the
concentration curve of FT1 relative to FT2 does not cross the diagonal of the unit square
except at the endpoints (0,0) and (1,1). To illustrate, we focus on the case of entering FT1
on the ordinate and FT2 on the abscissa, and on the half-space of the unit square below the
diagonal. Other arrangements are immediate. This means that for the same fractions q or
p as applied to the two income distributions,11 T 1 collects a smaller fraction of aggregate
taxes from smaller incomes than does T 2. A suﬃcient condition for the concentration
curve of FT1 relative to FT2 to lie wholly below the diagonal of the unit square is that it
is strictly convex.12 Figure 1 illustrates this case in terms of q.
Alas, the convexity (or concavity) condition is not a necessary condition for greater
tax progression. When comparing two situations, then there may well occur cases such
that convexity or concavity of the relative concentration curve is violated without its
crossing the diagonal within the unit square. Figure 2 illustrates.
11It can also be performed in terms of Y but this would require that both income distributions involved
have equal support; see Seidl (1994, pp. 347-9).
12Equivalently, one can require that the slope of a relative concentration curve be less than one below
a unique value of its argument and greater than one thereafter. Whereas this is equivalent to strict
convexity for the case of relative concentration curves, strict convexity produces the more intuitive and
precise formulations of the suﬃcient conditions.
11Figure 2: (Y1;T1) more progressive than (Y2;T2) with nonconvex relative concentration
curve
Alternatively, we may deﬁne a tax schedule T 1 to be uniformly more progressive than
T 2 whenever the concentration curve of FY 1 T1 (ordinate) relative to FY 2 T2 (abscissa)
lies wholly above the diagonal of the unit square except at the endpoints of the support
of the income distribution. This means that T 1 leaves the taxpayers a larger fraction
of aggregate net incomes for lower incomes than does T 2. Again the analysis can be
performed in terms of q or p. A suﬃcient condition for the concentration curve of FY 1 T1
relative to FY 2 T2 to lie wholly above the diagonal of the unit square is its strict concavity.
Negative taxes are excluded from this analysis.
It is readily seen from Figure 1 that, instead of working with relative concentration
curves, we can use the diﬀerences of the respective ﬁrst moment distribution functions.
To illustrate, we consider the tax case only; the extension to the net income case is
immediate. Suppose the relative concentration curve (with FT1 on the ordinate and FT2 on
the abscissa) is strictly convex. Note that a concentration curve of FT1() relative to FT2()
does not cross the diagonal iﬀ FT1() FT2() has the same sign for all q;p 2 (0;1). Then
the diﬀerence FT1  FT2 is negative with a unique minimum. If the relative concentration
curve is not convex, but, as in Figure 2, below the diagonal, then the diﬀerence of the
curves is negative with multiple minima. If the relative concentration curve crosses the
diagonal, the curve diﬀerences will be partly negative, partly positive. For a concave
12relative concentration curve, the curve diﬀerences are positive, single peaked for a strictly
concave relative concentration curve, and multiple peaked for a non-concave relative
concentration curve which is above the diagonal. Hence, the equivalence between relative
concentration curves and ﬁrst-order curve diﬀerences is obvious. We shall see that working
with curve diﬀerences is the more appropriate method for analyzing empirical data.
Uniformly greater tax progression can also be deﬁned in terms of second-order diﬀer-
ences of ﬁrst moment distribution functions.13 T 1 is then deﬁned to be uniformly more
progressive than T 2 whenever FY 1   FT1 > FY 2   FT2 holds for the whole support. This
second notion of uniformly greater tax progression indicates that the diﬀerence between
the ﬁrst moment distribution curves, which is due to the inﬂuence of taxation, is greater
for the income-distribution-cum-tax-schedule (Y 1;T 1) than for (Y 2;T 2). The correspond-
ing condition in terms of net incomes can be written as FY 1 T1   FY 1 > FY 2 T2   FY 2,
which means that the diﬀerence between the distribution of net incomes and gross in-
comes is greater for (Y 1;T 1) than for (Y 2;T 2). Therefore, taxation has caused greater
equality of net incomes for (Y 1;T 1) as compared with (Y 2;T 2), which is taken as a proxy
for greater uniform progression of taxation according to this deﬁnition.
Theorem 1 Assume 0 < T i[F
 1
i (q)] < F
 1
i (q) 8q 2 (0;1);i = 1;2, where FT1(q) is
placed on the ordinate and FT2(q) on the abscissa of the relative concentration curve.













q; i = 1;2:
A necessary and suﬃcient condition is given by the deﬁnition of uniformly greater tax
progression, applied to (Y 1;T 1) and (Y 2;T 2): FT1(q)  FT2(q) 8q 2 [0;1].
In terms of net incomes let FY 1 T1(q) be placed on the ordinate and FY 2 T2(q) on
the abscissa of the relative concentration curve. Then (Y 1;T 1) is more progressive than















i (q)   T i[F
 1
i (q)]
q; i = 1;2:
A necessary and suﬃcient condition is given by the deﬁnition of uniformly greater tax
progression, applied to (Y 1;T 1) and (Y 2;T 2): FY 1 T1(q)  FY 2 T2(q) 8q 2 [0;1].
The proof of Theorem 1 is easy: for the two suﬃcient conditions compute the second
derivative of the relative concentration curves. Setting the second derivative positive for
a strictly convex relative concentration curve and negative for a strictly concave relative
concentration curve (see Seidl (1994, p. 349)) yields the respective elasticities.
"(q) represents the relative increase in tax revenue collected from the fraction q of the
lowest income earners when q is slightly increased. When "1(q) and "2(q) are evaluated at
13See Lambert (1989, chap. 7) for similar concepts in the case of identical income distributions.
13the same value of q, for diﬀerent income distributions this means that they are evaluated
at diﬀerent income levels and/or in diﬀerent monetary units. Assume, for instance, that
we have F
 1
1 (q) = ^ Y 1 and F
 1
2 (q) = ^ Y 2. Then we are actually comparing
"
1(q) =
dT 1( ^ Y 1)=dY 1
T 1( ^ Y 1)f1( ^ Y 1)
q and "
2(q) =
dT 2( ^ Y 2))=dY 2
T 2( ^ Y 2)f2( ^ Y 2)
q;
where we have usually ^ Y 1 6= ^ Y 2, even if we are comparing tax schedules deﬁned for
the same monetary unit. Notice the tendency of a more unequal income distribution to
make the tax system more progressive, because a smaller ^ Y is associated with q, which
means that there is not much income concentrated in the fraction q of the poorest income
earners. Therefore not much tax revenue can be extracted from the lower income strata.
Note that these elasticities are not only cast in terms of tax or net income schedules,
but contain elements of both the tax schedules and the income distributions. They are
algebraic conditions but, alas, are only suﬃcient and not necessary conditions. The
respective deﬁnitions are trivial necessary and suﬃcient conditions which are helpful for
empirical analyses.14
Theorem 2 Assume 0 < T i[F
 1
Y i (p)] < F
 1
Y i (p) 8p 2 (0;1), i = 1;2, where F Y
T1(p) is
placed on the ordinate and F Y
T2(p) on the abscissa of the relative concentration curve. Then

























A necessary and suﬃcient condition is given by the deﬁnition of uniformly greater tax
progression, applied to (Y 1;T 1) and (Y 2;T 2): FT1(p)  FT2(p) 8p 2 [0;1].
In terms of net incomes, let F Y
Y 1 T1(p) be placed on the ordinate and F Y
Y 2 T2(p) on
the abscissa of the relative concentration curve. Then (Y 1;T 1) is more progressive than





























A necessary and suﬃcient condition is given by the deﬁnition of uniformly greater tax
progression, applied to (Y 1;T 1) and (Y 2;T 2): FY 1 T1(p)  FY 2 T2(p) 8p 2 [0;1].
Theorem 2 again contains two suﬃcient and two trivial necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions. What we have reasoned after Theorem 1 applies, mutatis mutandis, also for
14Although having a necessary and suﬃcient condition for their analysis in terms of deformed income
distributions, viz. isoelasticity of the deformation functions to warrant independence of the baseline dis-
tribution, Dardanoni and Lambert (2002, p. 106) had to concede that isoelasticity is a rather demanding
14Theorem 2. The only diﬀerence is that now the comparison of progression is made in
terms of shares of aggregate income instead of in income shares of population strata.
As concerns the suﬃcient conditions, "(p) [(p)] denotes the tax [residual income]
elasticity with respect to p, and (p) denotes the elasticity of the inverse ﬁrst moment
distribution function with respect to p, which captures the inﬂuence of the income dis-
tribution evaluated at p. The proof of Theorem 2 is a complete analogue of that of
Theorem 1, if applied to relative concentration curves in terms of income shares. When
"1(p)   1(p) and "2(p)   2(p) are evaluated at the same value of p, this means that
diﬀerent ^ Yi’s are involved.
The next theorem analyzes greater progression in terms of second-order diﬀerences of
ﬁrst moment distribution functions.
Theorem 3 Assume 0 < T i[F
 1
i (q)] < F
 1
i (q) 8 q 2 (0;1), i = 1;2. Then FY 1(q)  
FT1(q) > FY 2(q)   FT2(q) > 0 8 q 2 (0;1), if both "1(q)  "2(q) and 	1(q)  	2(q) 8q 2
(0;1), where at least one of the two inequality signs has to be strict. Notice that "i(q),





i (q) q; i = 1;2, denotes the elasticity
of the inverse distribution function.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition is given by the deﬁnition of uniformly greater tax
progression, applied to (Y 1;T 1) and (Y 2;T 2): FY 1(q)   FT1(q)  FY 2(q)   FT2(q) >
0 8 q 2 (0;1).
Moreover, FY 1(q)   FY 1 T1(q) < FY 2(q)   FY 2 T2(q) < 0 8 q 2 (0;1) if both 1(q) 
2(q) and 	1(q)  	2(q) 8 q 2 (0;1), where at least one of the two inequality signs has
to be strict. Notice that i(q);i = 1;2, is deﬁned as in Theorem 1.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition is given by the deﬁnition of uniformly greater tax
progression, applied to (Y 1;T 1) and (Y 2;T 2): FY 1(q) FY 1 T1(q)  FY 2(q) FY 2 T2(q) <
0 8 q 2 (0;1).
The proof of Theorem 3 is more involved than the proof of Theorem 1 (see Seidl
(1994, pp. 352-3)). Note that the algebraic conditions are only suﬃcient conditions.
They contain in their ﬁrst components elements of both the tax schedule and the income
distribution, while their second components refer to the income distributions only. These
latter components serve the role of a calibration device to warrant that the tax distri-
butions are not triggered by great discrepancies in the distributions of gross incomes.
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions are again elementary; they are very helpful for
empirical analyses.
Theorem 3 concerns comparisons between diﬀerences of cumulative curves of gross
incomes and taxes and comparisons between diﬀerences of cumulative curves of net in-
comes and gross incomes. If FY 1(q) is more diminished by subtraction of the tax curve,
viz. FT1(q), than FY 2(q) is by FT2(q) for all q, 0  q  1, then (Y 1;T 1) is more progressive
condition which will hardly be met in the real world. (For this approach see also Footnote 1.) Hence, com-
15than (Y 2;T 2). If FY 1 T1(q) is more diminished by subtraction of FY 1(q) than FY 2 T2(q)
is by FY 2(q) for all q, 0  q  1, then (Y 1;T 1) is more progressive than (Y 2;T 2).
Note that dominance relations of concentrations curves are subrelations of appropriate
global inequality measures; of course, the converse does not hold. In this paper, we do
not dwell on that; for more details see Seidl (1994, pp. 359-60).
3.3 Uniform Tax Progression for Diﬀerent Income Distributions:
Discrete Version
So far empirical comparisons of tax progression have not been made for the uniform
measures of tax progression in terms of q or p that allow to compare progression for
diﬀerent income distributions in diﬀerent countries or diﬀerent time periods in the same
countries. We investigate the theory developed in the preceding section using the data
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). As the LIS data are micro data, we have to
re-state all deﬁnitions and curves in discrete terms.
As we analyze comparisons of progression of direct taxes on the one hand, and direct
taxes plus payroll taxes (mainly employees’ share of social security contributions) on
the other, we have to introduce the respective notation. We use Y = [Y1;Y2;:::;Yn]
to denote a distribution of pre-tax or gross incomes arranged in nondecreasing order,
T = [T1;T2;:::;Tn] to denote the distribution of the associated direct taxes, and S =
[S1;S2;:::;Sn] to denote the distribution of direct taxes plus payroll taxes. , , and
 denote mean pre-tax or gross income, mean direct taxes, and mean direct taxes plus
payroll taxes, respectively. For generic references we will continue to use the terms
gross and net incomes. When respective discriminations are needed, the terms pre-tax
and post-tax incomes will be used for direct taxes only, and gross and net incomes for
analyses of direct taxes plus payroll taxes.
Let (Y;T) denote the income-distribution-cum-tax-schedule for some country or some
time period within a country. Let us also deﬁne the discrete equivalents of the ﬁrst
moment distribution functions in terms of point coordinates with the ﬁrst entry being
the ordinate, and the second entry being the abscissa of the respective points. For ease
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In formulae (11) to (15), we set Y0 and T0 equal to zero, which allows us to include
the origin into our curves15. Strictly speaking, both the right-hand side and the left-hand
side of (11) to (15) are functions of k. Hence we consider the range of the right-hand-side
function as the domain of the left-hand-side function, which gives us the discrete versions
of the ﬁrst-moment distribution functions. For all curves in terms of q we use the ranking
according to gross incomes, as we have to apply that necessarily also for the curves in
terms of p. Here, (11) denotes a discrete equivalent of the Lorenz income curve, (12), and
(13) denote the discrete equivalents of the concentration curves of taxes and net incomes,
respectively. (14) and (15) denote the discrete equivalents of the concentration curves
of taxes and net incomes for the income shares p
j
k. These mappings are just generic; of
course, diﬀerent situations (Y 1;T 1) and (Y 2;T 2) have diﬀerent components and diﬀerent
numbers of income recipients.16
Concentration curves may be diﬀerent from Lorenz curves because of re-ranking phe-
nomena. Hence, before proceeding further, we have to dwell on the re-ranking prob-
lem which we assumed away for our theoretical analyses, but which haunts all empir-
ical analyses of distributional problems. For theoretical analyses, the assumption of
co-monotonicity of gross incomes, taxes, payroll taxes, and net incomes is self-evident:
higher gross incomes should imply higher taxes, higher payroll taxes, and higher net in-
comes. This means that the ordering of gross incomes coincides with the orderings of
taxes, payroll taxes, and net incomes. Hence, only one ordering applies to all designs and
we can work with Lorenz curves (or their discrete-case equivalents) throughout. How-
ever, in the world of empirical data, re-ranking is ubiquitous. Due to diﬀerent family
structures, diﬀerent tax allowances, diﬀerent income compositions, and diﬀerent transfer
incomes, households with higher incomes may end up with smaller taxes or, else, with
smaller net incomes than households with smaller gross incomes.
Hence, re-ranking opens up Pandora’s box of possible other orderings. For instance,
for expression (12) we can arrange the entries in nondecreasing order of the taxes instead
of arranging them according to the order of their associated gross incomes. In (13), net
incomes can be arranged in nondecreasing order instead of arranging them according
to their associated gross incomes. Then we could work with Lorenz curves throughout
instead of using concentration curves. Indeed, in the presence of re-ranking, concentration
curves would be closer to the diagonal than Lorenz curves, or may even cross the diagonal.
15Recall that we exclude negative incomes and taxes in our empirical analysis.
16Note that for the discrete version we continue to use superscripts to refer to the two diﬀerent vectors
of taxes and incomes, each representing the situation as a whole, while subscripts are used for vector
17For the sake of a uniform methodology we decided in favor of ordering all entries
according to gross incomes for our empirical analyses. To illustrate, consider the analysis
in terms of the aggregate shares pk. Observe that the mapping for gross incomes boils
down to F Y
Y (pk) = pk, i.e., it consists just of points on the diagonal of the unit square.
Had we ordered the entries in formula (14) not in terms of gross incomes, but in terms of
taxes, i.e., had we set pk =
Pk
i=1 Ti
n , then we would again have only gotten points on the
diagonal of the unit square. The same would apply if we had ordered the pk’s according
to the net incomes in formula (15). On the other hand, analyses in terms of aggregate
shares are sensible from an economic point of view. If from the lowest income recipients
whose aggregate income amounts to 20 percent of total income, 5 percent of total tax
revenue is collected, then at p1
k = 0:2, F Y 1
T1 (p1
k) = 0:05, and (Y 1;T 1) is more progressive
than (Y 2;T 2) if, e.g., p2
k = 0:2 (or its respective interpolation point on the second moment
distribution curve) and F Y 2
T2 = 0:10. If the same pattern holds for all 0 < p
j
k < 1 (or for
the respective interpolation points of the curves constructed by connecting neighboring
points by straight lines), then (Y 1;T 1) is uniformly more progressive than (Y 2;T 2). The
same applies mutatis mutandis to the net incomes. Hence, the request for comparability
of analyses of tax progression in terms of the pk’s on the one hand and the qk’s on the
other suggests that we should also use the gross-income rankings for our analyses in terms
of q.
Beyond that, there is still another reason for using gross-income rankings throughout:
neither taxes nor net incomes exist in isolation. Instead, they derive their existence from
their association with gross incomes. Hence, this serves as an additional argument to
treat them according to the ordering of gross incomes for our analyses in terms of the
qk’s. Finally, using EUROMOD data, Peichl and Schäfer (2008, pp. 9-12) have shown
that the diﬀerence between the Gini and the concentration coeﬃcients of net incomes are
rather small and re-ranking as measured by the Reynolds-Smolensky progression measure
is far from dramatic. Hence, the possible error from ignoring re-ranking is quite small.
Another aspect of the re-ranking problem concerns equivalized incomes. Our analyses
are carried out in terms of both household and equivalized incomes. The latter are derived
from the former by applying equivalence scales to take into account economies of scale
in large households.17 For our analyses we applied the equivalence scales as proposed by
LIS: to derive equivalized incomes, we divided the household incomes by m, where m
denotes the number of household members, and ; 0    1, denotes a scale parameter;
mainly we followed the LIS practice of taking  = 0:5, but in order to investigate the
inﬂuence of the scale parameter, we also tried  = 0:25 and  = 0:75 for selected cases.18
components.
17See, e.g., Blackorby and Donaldson (1983), Klein (1986), Buhmann et al. (1988), Glewwe (1991),
Coulter et al. (1992), Banks and Johnson (1994), Jenkins and Cowell (1994), Faik (1995), Aaberge and
Melby (1998), Cowell and Mercader-Prats (1999), Ebert and Moyes (2003), and Schröder (2004).
18Buhmann et al. (1988, pp. 119-122) investigated 34 equivalence scales which were proposed by various
researchers, and found that the Luxembourg equivalence formula ﬁts them well for various values of  for
18To illustrate, consider an income distribution comprising two households: [1000,2500].
Suppose that the ﬁrst one is a single-person household, while the second one is a four-
person household. Then, if we take  = 0:5, the equivalized income distribution becomes
[1000,1250,1250,1250,1250]; however, taking  = 0:75 gives us the equivalized income
distribution [884,884,884,884,1000]. Hence, both the household structure19 and the choice
of the scale parameter determine the shape of the equivalized income distribution. In our
analysis, equivalized incomes were always arranged in nondecreasing order of equivalized
gross incomes.
After the digression on re-ranking, let us return to the concepts of uniformly more
progressive tax schedules. Recall that we deﬁned (Y 1;T 1) to be more progressive than
(Y 2;T 2) if the tax schedule T 1 associated with the income distribution Y 1 collects for all
values of q or p no greater fraction of taxes than does tax schedule T 2 associated with the
income distribution Y 2. Alternatively, we deﬁned greater progression of (Y 1;T 1) than
(Y 2;T 2) if (Y 1;T 1) leaves the taxpayers for all q or p no less a fraction of post-tax net
incomes than does (Y 2;T 2). Finally, we deﬁned greater progression if the diﬀerence of
the cumulative curves of gross incomes and taxes for (Y 1;T 1) is not smaller than the
diﬀerence of the cumulative curves of gross incomes and taxes for (Y 2;T 2) for all q, or
when the diﬀerence of the cumulative curves of gross and net incomes of (Y 1;T 1) is not
greater than the diﬀerence of the cumulative curves of gross incomes and taxes of (Y 2;T 2)
for all q.20
For the continuous analyses we expressed the ﬁrst two concepts in terms of relative
concentration curves, and the second two in terms of second-order curve diﬀerences. More
progression is present if the relative concentration curve does not cut the diagonal within
the unit square, or if the second-order curve diﬀerences do not cut the abscissa within
the unit interval. For the discrete analysis, it is more convenient to use curve diﬀerences
quite generally.21 As the respective “curves” in the discrete case consist of ﬁnitely many
four representative groups of proposed equivalence scales. Buhmann et al. (1988, p. 128) also observed
that income inequality ﬁrst decreases and then increases as  increases, viz. inequality is an U-shaped
function of ; poverty decreases as  increases (p. 132). For more elaborate work see Coulter et al.
(1992), Banks and Johnson (1994), Jenkins and Cowell (1994), Faik (1995), and Cowell and Mercader-
Prats (1999).
19Buhmann et al. (1988, p. 127) argue that equivalence scales have greater eﬀect in case of diﬀerent
household structures associated with the actual income distributions to be compared; greater households,
in particular, inﬂuence the results. Peichl et al. (2009a,b) observed that part of the increase in income
inequality in Germany in terms of equivalized incomes is due to the trend in the direction of smaller
households in the last decades.
20See also p. 12. Concerning the deﬁnitions in terms of p. see Footnote 9, which applies to the discrete
case as well.
21The case of a relative concentration curve being below (or above) the diagonal in the interior of
the unit square is equivalent to a positive (negative) diﬀerence of the generating curves within the unit
interval. Recall that a concentration curve of FT 1() relative to FT 2() does not cross the diagonal iﬀ
FT 1()   FT 2() has the same sign for all q;p 2 (0;1). The proof is trivial and therefore omitted. Note
that this applies analogously also to net incomes.
19points, we have to conﬁne ourselves to the comparison of these points. In the general
case, as deﬁned in formulae (11) to (15), we encounter the diﬃculty that the qk’s and
the pk’s need not coincide for (Y 1;T 1) and (Y 2;T 2), so that we may have k1’s for which
there are no equal k2’s, and vice versa. This can be handled in a more tedious way by
comparing q1
k with the equivalent point on the interpolation segment on the second curve.
For reasons to be explained in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we used grouped data with the same
number of quantiles. Before that, we explain our measures of comparisons of progression
in terms of individual data.
For the sake of uniﬁed representation we have arranged all deﬁnitions of greater pro-
gression in such a way that progression dominance is expressed as nonnegative curve
diﬀerences and being progression dominated as nonpositive curve diﬀerences. Hence, we
have:
Deﬁnition 1 (Y 1;T 1) is more [less] progressive than (Y 2;T 2) iﬀ FT2(qk)   FT1(qk) is
nonnegative [nonpositive] for all qk, 0  qk  1.
Deﬁnition 2 (Y 1;T 1) is more [less] progressive than (Y 2;T 2) iﬀ F Y
T2(pk)   F Y
T1(pk) is
nonnegative [nonpositive] for all pk, 0  pk  1.
Deﬁnition 3 (Y 1;T 1) is more [less] progressive than (Y 2;T 2) iﬀ FY 1 T1(qk) FY 2 T2(qk)
is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all qk, 0  qk  1.
Deﬁnition 4 (Y 1;T 1) is more [less] progressive than (Y 2;T 2) iﬀ F Y
Y 1 T1(pk) F Y
Y 2 T2(pk)
is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all pk, 0  pk  1.
Deﬁnition 5 (Y 1;T 1) is more [less] progressive than (Y 2;T 2) iﬀ [FY 1(qk)   FY 2(qk)]  
[FT1(qk)   FT2(qk)] is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all qk, 0  qk  1.
Deﬁnition 6 (Y 1;T 1) is more [less] progressive than (Y 2;T 2) iﬀ [FY 1 T1(qk) FY 2 T2(qk)] 
[FY 1(qk)   FY 2(qk)] is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all qk, 0  qk  1.
Obviously, Deﬁnition 1 matches the necessary and suﬃcient conditions of the ﬁrst
part of Theorem 1. Deﬁnition 2 matches the necessary and suﬃcient condition of the
ﬁrst part of Theorem 2. Deﬁnition 3 matches the necessary and suﬃcient condition of the
second part of Theorem 1. Deﬁnition 4 matches the necessary and suﬃcient condition of
the second part of Theorem 2. Deﬁnition 5 matches the necessary and suﬃcient condition
of the ﬁrst part of Theorem 3. Note that Deﬁnition 5 comes from the formulation that
(Y 1;T 1) is more [less] progressive than (Y 2;T 2) iﬀ [FY 1(qk) FT1(qk)]  [FY 2(qk) FT2(qk)]
[ for less progressive] for all qk, 0  qk  1. Deﬁnition 6 matches the necessary and
suﬃcient condition of the second part of Theorem 3. Note that Deﬁnition 6 comes from
the formulation that (Y 1;T 1) is more [less] progressive than (Y 2;T 2) iﬀ [FY 1 T1(qk)  
FY 1(qk)]  [FY 2 T2(qk)   FY 2(qk)] [ for less progressive] for all qk, 0  qk  1.
203.4 Heuristics of Progression Comparisons
3.4.1 Heuristics of the First Moment Distribution Functions
To provide some intuition of the proposed method of progression comparisons, we assume
in this section that we have the same number of taxpayers n in both situations to be
compared and deal with the individual data of the taxpayers. Hence, in formulae (11) to
(15) k runs from 0 to n. Then, for the same k the left-hand sides of (12) and (14) have the
same value, and the left-hand sides of (13) and (15) have the same value. What makes
FT(qk) and F Y
T (pk) as well as FY  T(qk) and F Y
Y  T(pk) diﬀerent are the second components
of their respective points. For FT(qk) and FY  T(qk) they are k
n = qk, whereas for F Y
T (pk)
and F Y
Y  T(pk) they are
Pk
i=1 Yi
n = pk, i.e. FY(qk). Now FY(qk)  qk, since FY(qk) is
the Lorenz curve of gross incomes. Hence, the p-curves lie North-West of the respective
q-curves.















Hence, both FT(qk) and FY  T(qk) are equal to the Lorenz curve of gross incomes FY(qk),
and both FT(pk) and FY  T(pk) are equal to the diagonal of the unit square.
Suppose co-monotonicity of gross incomes, taxes, and net incomes holds. Then we
have for progressive taxes (that is
Ti
Yi is nondecreasing for all i)




Y  T(pk)  pk  F
Y
T (pk):


















Because of a progressive tax schedule,
Pk
i=1 Ti Pk
i=1 Yi is also a nondecreasing series of k.22 Hence
it is bounded above by 
. This establishes the ﬁrst inequality in (17).
22Proof: suppose by contradiction that
Pk
i=1 Ti Pk












i=1 Yi, where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the
nondecreasing average tax rate.








holds. It is immediately seen that this reduces to (18) and, thus, establishes the second
part of inequality (17).
Hence, for co-monotonicity and progressive taxation F Y
Y  T(pk) lies above and F Y
T (pk)
below the diagonal of the unit square. For co-monotonicity and increasing, but regressive,
taxation the opposite inequality signs hold in the inequalities (16) and (17).
When re-ranking occurs, co-monotonicity is violated, and the resulting concentration
curves below the diagonal exhibit less curvature, and the concentration curves above
the diagonal [this is F Y
Y  T(pk)] more curvature, i.e., the ﬁrst group moves closer to the
diagonal and the second further away from the diagonal. Although cases such that the
inequalities (16) and (17) are violated may be constructed, they hold in most cases for
empirical data. Recall that Peichl and Schäfer (2008, pp. 9-12) found that the re-ranking
eﬀects are not spectacular.
3.4.2 Heuristics of Uniformly Greater Progression
Concerning Deﬁnitions 1 to 6, for empirical data the net incomes are more equally dis-
tributed than the gross incomes, and gross incomes are more equally distributed than
taxes. This means that the q-curves for net incomes exhibit the least curvature, followed
by the q-curves for gross incomes, with the q-curves for taxes having the most curvature.
As to the p-curves, they become the diagonal for gross incomes, a convex curve for taxes,
and a concave curve for net incomes.
Uniformly Greater Tax Progression: Formally Stated Deﬁnition 1 states that
(Y 1;T 1) is more progressive than (Y 2;T 2), if the ﬁrst moment distribution function of T 1
with respect to q lies below that of T 2. The degree of higher progression can be measured
by taking the diﬀerence between these curves, which in turn can be captured by the area
under the curve FT2(qk)   FT1(qk) keeping in mind the sign of the diﬀerence. Deﬁnition
2 does the same for the ﬁrst moment distribution functions of taxes with respect to p.
Because of our above observation we would expect a smaller diﬀerence on average for the
p-curves than for the q-curves.
According to Deﬁnition 3, (Y 1;T 1) is more progressive than (Y 2;T 2), if the ﬁrst
moment distribution function with respect to qk of the net incomes (Y 1   T 1) lies above
that of (Y 2   T 2). That is, for each quantile qk (except at the end points) the quantile’s
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i=1 Yi < Yk
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where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the nondecreasing average tax rate. Backward induction shows
for k = 2 that T2
Y2 < T1
Y1, which contradicts the condition of nondecreasing average tax rates. Q.E.D.
22pattern holds for Deﬁnition 4, which deﬁnes (Y 1;T 1) as more progressive than (Y 2;T 2),
if the ﬁrst moment distribution function with respect to pk of the net incomes (Y 1  T 1)
lies above that of (Y 2   T 2). This means that for each gross income quantile pk (except
at the end points) the quantile’s fraction of the total net income is higher under (Y 1;T 1)
than under (Y 2;T 2). Note that, in contrast to the q-curves, this means that, because of
inequality (17), F Y
Y 1 T1(pk) lies further apart from the diagonal than does F Y
Y 2 T2(pk) for
all pk’s if (Y 1;T 1) is more progressive.
Deﬁnition 5 uses the diﬀerence between FY(qk) and FT(qk) as the basis for comparisons
of progression. If for (Y 1;T 1) this diﬀerence exceeds the one for (Y 2;T 2) for all q’s (except
at the end points), then (Y 1;T 1) is considered more progressive than (Y 2;T 2). Deﬁnition
6 takes an analogous approach using FY  T(qk) and FY(qk).
Uniformly Greater Tax Progression: Interaction of Tax Schedules and Income
Distributions We employed Deﬁnitions 1 to 6 to make comparisons of tax progression.
Our approach diﬀers from the conventional one by considering the case of diﬀerent tax
schedules and diﬀerent income distributions for the situations to be compared. This
means that both components of tax progression interact.
Starting with Deﬁnition 1, suppose FY 2(qk)  FY 1(qk) 8qk with at least one strict
inequality sign, and suppose that we have proportional taxes in both situations. Then
the ﬁrst moment distribution functions of incomes translate immediately to FT2(qk) 
FT1(qk) 8qk with at least one inequality sign strict. This implies that (Y 1;T 1) is, accord-
ing to Deﬁnition 1, considered as being more progressive than (Y 2;T 2), although both
taxes are proportional. Hence, the more unequal distribution of gross incomes Y 1 causes
(Y 1;T 1) to be more progressive than (Y 2;T 2). This is simply the consequence of allowing
the income distribution an equal inﬂuence as the tax schedule on the determination of
the progression of (Y;T). In other words, the distribution of gross incomes may reinforce
or attenuate the eﬀects of progression of the pure tax schedule. For instance, if a slightly
progressive tax schedule is associated with a rather unequal distribution of gross incomes,
the concentration curve of the taxes may well be dominated by the concentration curves
of rather progressive taxes associated with a more equal distribution of gross incomes.23
Deﬁnition 2 precludes a proportional tax from becoming more progressive than an-
other proportional tax, since F Y
Y (pk) happens to be the diagonal. Hence, F Y
T (pk) lies
below the diagonal for progressive tax schedules. But the distribution of gross incomes
interferes also for Deﬁnition 2 with the tax schedule and may reinforce or attenuate the
progression of the pure tax schedule.
The inﬂuence of the distribution of gross incomes is even more pronounced for Def-
inition 3 than for Deﬁnition 1 because gross incomes usually have a higher impact on
net incomes than on the associated taxes. A more equal distribution of net incomes may
23Note that this is merely a possibility. Taxes are levied on absolute rather than relative incomes.
Therefore, considerations beyond proportional taxation are subject to speculation.
23result from a progressive tax schedule and/or from a more equal distribution of gross
incomes. Only if the income distribution is the same can we attribute greater progression
to the tax schedule alone. The other end of the gamut is established by the case of a
proportional tax for which greater progression is wholly determined by the distribution
of gross incomes. In eﬀect, the inﬂuence of the distribution of gross incomes is at most
pronounced for the net incomes, which, in turn governs the behavior of Deﬁnition 3.
Deﬁnition 4 precludes a proportional tax from becoming more progressive than an-
other proportional tax, since F Y
Y  T(pk) becomes equal to F Y
Y (pk), which is the diago-
nal. For progressive tax schedules, F Y
Y  T(pk) lies, according to (17), above the diagonal.
Comparisons of tax progression are again heavily inﬂuenced by the distribution of gross
incomes. This eﬀect is even more pronounced for Deﬁnition 4 than for Deﬁnition 2.
Re-arranging Deﬁnitions 5 and 6, we have the terms [FY(qk) FT(qk)] and [FY  T(qk) 
FY(qk)], respectively. Recall that these terms are zero for proportional taxes. Hence,
Deﬁnitions 5 and 6 become zero for proportional tax schedules. In a way, Deﬁnitions 5
and 6 calibrate for the gross income distributions, as they just consider the deviations of
the ﬁrst moment distribution of the gross incomes from the ﬁrst moment distributions
of the taxes or net incomes, respectively. Hence, the inﬂuence of the distributions of
gross incomes is partly neutralized. Moreover, at ﬁrst sight Deﬁnitions 5 and 6, as they
were formulated above, may invoke the wrong conclusion that they provide a separation
between the inﬂuence of the income distribution on the one hand, and the tax schedule on
the other. But this impression is not correct, since the terms FT(qk) and FY  T(qk) are by
themselves inﬂuenced by the respective gross income distributions. This is also evidenced
from Theorems 1 to 3, which show us that the tax schedules and the income distributions
are intrinsically amalgamated so that a straightforward separation of their inﬂuence is
not at hand.24 Hence, Deﬁnitions 5 and 6 may be considered a second-best approach at
separating the inﬂuence of the distributions of gross incomes and tax schedules. Here
also the tax terms and the net income terms depend on the income distribution, which
prevents a clear-cut separation between these inﬂuences.
4 Data and Results
Our empirical investigation addresses several problems:
24For the suﬃcient conditions, Theorems 2 and 3 may at ﬁrst sight impart the impression of separate
inﬂuences of the elasticities of the tax schedules or net incomes on the one hand, and the elasticities (p)
and 	(q) on the other. However, this impression obscures that the elasticities "() and () themselves
depend in intricate ways on the income distributions (which applies also to Theorem 1). [Note that things
are diﬀerent for the analysis in terms of income. For the suﬃcient conditions in terms of taxes and net
incomes we observe the sum of the elasticity of the density function of the income distribution on the
one hand, and the tax elasticity or the residual income elasticity on the other; see Seidl (1994, pp. 347-
8). However, this analysis applies only to cases of identical monetary units and identical support of the
income distributions involved.] The work of Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) may also be viewed under
the aspect of separating tax schedules and income distributions. These authors employ deformation
functions to mimic the income distribution of the other country to be compared. However, this possible
24Firstly, recall that the method of comparing tax progression which we proposed de-
termines not a complete, but only a partial ordering. This provokes the question whether
it is of major relevance because it might be that the tax schedules associated with their
respective income distributions are so involved that only few clear-cut dominance rela-
tions emerge. In other words: is our method of comparison of tax progression in the real
world only a will-o’-the-wisp, or can it command major occurrence?
Secondly, if our ﬁrst question is responded in the aﬃrmative, what is the relative
performance of the six proposed measures of the comparison of tax progression? Are
there interrelationships? What are the economic message and content of these methods?
Thirdly, what is the relative importance of suﬃcient and necessary conditions of com-
parisons of tax progression? For which fraction of greater tax progression the relative
concentration curves would be strictly convex or concave, and for which they would just
not cross the diagonal of the unit square without being strictly convex or concave? If
the respective elasticity conditions do not hold, can we safely assume that greater tax
progression is unlikely or can we expect it to be rather common?
Fourthly, what is the pattern of comparisons of tax progression when dominance
relations do not hold? Do we mainly encounter bifurcate or more intricate progression
patterns? Is there a change of the progression pattern at a unique threshold, or do we
have a whole series of changes of the progression relations?
Our analyses are carried out for both household data and equivalized data. We used
the respective data from the Luxembourg Income Study database (see LIS (2010)). We
mainly focus on international comparisons of tax progression, but also carry out intertem-
poral comparisons of tax progression for selected countries. Furthermore, we perform a
sensitivity analysis with respect to the LIS equivalence scale parameter. To address these
and related questions, we need household data for both gross and net incomes. In addi-
tion to that, for intertemporal comparisons for each country we required the data from
at least three recent survey periods (“waves” in LIS terminology; in particular, we used
waves III up to VI if the respective data allowed). Data sets showing gross incomes, direct
taxes, payroll taxes, and net incomes were available just for 15 countries out of which we
took 13, representing in our view the most salient ones. As a shorthand terminology we
will use “taxes” to refer either to direct taxes or to direct taxes plus payroll taxes.
We will start with a short description of handling the LIS data, then will report six
tables with pairwise progression comparisons for Deﬁnitions 1 to 6, followed by comments
on six tables with summary results. Then we will analyze sixteen selected graphs for
progression comparison related to comparing Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, as well as comparing Germany and Sweden, in terms of household incomes
with direct taxes and direct taxes plus payroll taxes, and in terms of equivalized data for
direct taxes and direct taxes plus payroll taxes. To provide an overview of our ﬁndings
way of decomposition works only for isoelastic deformation functions to secure independence of the
baseline distribution (see also Footnotes 1 and 14).
25for international progression comparisons, we will present Hasse diagrams. Finally, we
provide examples of intertemporal progression comparisons and sensitivity results with
respect to the parameter of the Luxembourg equivalence scale.
Note that this paper is entirely devoted to numerical analyses. We defer the statisti-
cal analysis to subsequent work due to much higher computation requirements for data
processing on the LIS side (see also Footnote 30).
4.1 Handling LIS Data
Our empirical analysis resorts to micro data drawn from the LIS (2010) database. It is
a cross-national data archive located in Luxembourg.25 Currently it includes micro data
from more than 30 countries, most of which are OECD member states. The data sets
are organized into “waves” of about ﬁve years each, starting with Wave I in 1980 and the
most recent being Wave VI (around 2004). The micro data from the diﬀerent surveys
is harmonized and standardized in order to facilitate comparative research. For many
countries, however, only a limited number of waves is available, and even if a data set is
available, not all income variables are included. In particular, gross incomes, direct taxes
and payroll taxes are available only for 15 countries, of which we used 13 in our study.
Table 1 gives a summary of the countries and waves used. The countries are listed
according to the country codes which were used to access the data sets. Columns III to
VI list the years to which the data sets, included in the respective waves, refer to. For
international comparisons, we took Wave V (around 2000) because of its relative recency
and as maximizing the number of available country data. We also included France, but
due to data availability, we had to rely on wave 1994. Poland’s Wave III data set was
not included as we deem it being too close to the fall of the Iron Curtain.
Within the data sets, at the household level LIS reports, inter alia, gross income
(GI), disposable net income (DPI), income taxes (V11) and mandatory payroll taxes
(PAYROLL). In what follows, we employ two diﬀerent net income deﬁnitions. Net income
is deﬁned either in accordance with LIS as DPI=GI (V11+PAYROLL), or it is redeﬁned
by us as GI V11, i.e., the analysis is based on taxes only.26 It should be noted, however,
that V11 in some cases already includes social security contributions if these were lumped
together in the original data set before adding it to LIS. Furthermore, some countries like
25For more information about the LIS database see Smeeding et al. (1985), Smeeding (2004), and
Atkinson (2004). For illustrative examples of applications of the LIS database see, e.g., Allegrezza et al.
(2004), Bardasi (2004), Bronchetti and Sullivan (2003), Gornick (2004), Förster and Vleminckx (2004),
and Mahler and Jesuit (2006).
26This means that taxes include so-called clawbacks. i.e., taxes which return to government part of
the transfer. Prasad and Deng (2009, p. 439) remark: “This means that where transfers are high, taxes
on transfers may be high, but this is not ‘true’ tax, simply a reduction in the amount of transfer given.
To achieve a measure of true tax paid, then, the amount of clawbacks should be subtracted from the
total tax paid.” However, we opine that clawbacks are an integral part of the tax system. In contrast to
Prasad and Deng (2009) we also do not consider indirect taxes in our investigations.
26Table 1: LIS Data Sets Used for International and Intertemporal Comparisons
LIS Wave
Country Code III IV V VI
Australia au 1989 1995 2001 2003
Canada ca 1991 1994 2000 2004
Switzerland ch 1992 – 2000 2004
Denmark dk 1992 1995 2000 2004
Germany de 1989 1994 2000 –
Finland ﬁ 1991 1995 2000 2004
France fr ./. 1994 – –
Netherlands nl 1991 1994 1999 –
Norway no 1991 1995 2000 2004
Poland pl ./. 1995 1999 2004
Sweden se 1992 1995 2000 –
United Kingdom uk 1991 1995 1999 2004
United States us 1991 1994 2000 2004
Table notes. Boldfaced years were used for inter-
national comparisons. A dash means that a gross
income data set is not available. ./. means that
the respective wave was not used though available.
Denmark do not have separate mandatory social security contributions for most of the
population. In these cases PAYROLL stays empty and we cannot distinguish between
taxes and payroll.
The analysis was carried out at the household level as well as the level of equivalized
data. The former analysis rests upon the original data provided by LIS, weighed by
household weights (HWEIGHT). These weights are intended to secure representativeness
of the results for the whole population of a country. However, the representativeness of
the current study is somewhat reduced by the fact that up to 7 percent of the households
listed in each data set had to be truncated to warrant nonnegative gross and net incomes,27
nonnegative taxes and payroll taxes. For the individual-based analysis, equivalized data
was used. First, all monetary variables were multiplied by the Luxembourg equivalence
scale which is m , where m represents the number of household members (D4). If not
otherwise stated,  was set equal to 0.5. We also performed sensitivity analyses for some
countries with  = f0:25;0:5;0:75g. Second, household weights had to be replaced by
person weights which were computed as D4HWEIGHT.
In order to access the LIS data, we wrote a program in SPSS that computed the
27Some data sets are censored in the way that negative incomes are reported as zeros. Hence, we
decided to leave out all entries which are nonpositive with respect to either GI or DPI or both.
27values of FY(q), FT(q), and so on, at 20 equally spaced quantiles of the unit interval
and printed back these results for every data set (country and year), for taxes and taxes
plus payroll taxes for both household and equivalized data. We had to use this approach
because direct access to LIS data is not permitted. We then wrote a Visual Basic macro
to facilitate processing of the LIS output oﬄine.
4.2 Heuristics of Progression Comparisons for Grouped Data
Our formulae and deﬁnitions presented in Section 3.3 and discussed in Section 3.4 were
cast in terms of individual data. Although this approach appears prima facie as the proper
one, we could not apply it to our empirical work because, ﬁrst, LIS does not allow direct
access to its data (hence we had to compute all the aggregates for our analysis online,
which presents a challenge since a resource-demanding program code is not welcomed
by LIS), and, second, the numbers of taxpayers in the populations to be compared are
typically diﬀerent. This last feature would have necessitated tedious ad hoc interpolation
procedures for all pairwise comparisons. To deal with both issues in a more expedient
way, we employed the following approach using grouped data.
We divided the unit interval into 20 shares, i.e., taking ﬁve-percent steps28 as equally
spaced quantiles for q in terms of population shares and for p in terms of income shares.
This assumption implies that the respective transformed indices j coincide for all respec-
tive situations to be compared in formulae (11) to (15), that is j = 0;1;:::;20. For our
work with LIS data this approach has the decisive advantage that we are able to quickly
process the data for all 13 countries at the LIS server (the critical time consuming part
of our computations) and then analyze the results oﬄine.
We started our procedure by arranging the raw data (taxes and associated net in-
comes) in our sample in the increasing order of the associated gross incomes; for equiv-
alized incomes the data were re-arranged in the increasing order of equivalized gross
incomes. Next, we divided the unit intervals, which correspond to the ranges of the
cumulative distribution function for gross incomes, into 20 equally spaced ﬁve-percent
groups for the analysis in terms of population quantiles q, and in terms of income quan-
tiles p, respectively. Then we took the respective shares of aggregate taxes, gross and
net incomes associated with these ﬁve-percent quantiles. Thus we obtained the values
for qj, pj, FY(qj), FT(qj), FY  T(qj), F Y
T (pj), and F Y
Y  T(pj) for our grouped data, where
j = 0;1;:::;20.
But the curves for grouped data deviate from the curves for individual data in sev-
eral respects. For individual data, as we observed in Section 3.4.1, if we have the same
28As compared to other empirical work, this is a rather ﬁne grid. Sala-i-Martin (2006, pp. 355 and
357), for instance, had to work with quintiles and had to resort to widespread data interpolations for
carrying out his ambitious study. Bishop et al. (1991a, p. 464) worked with deciles for their construction
of Lorenz curves, arguing that “increasing the number of quantiles does not necessarily improve the
quality of the overall test” (p. 476, Footnote 5).
28number of income recipients and (for the same value of k) the same partial sums for
both the q-curve and the p-curve, then we have the same corresponding values on either
curve’s ordinate; hence, by pk  qk, the curves diﬀer only by their corresponding values
on the abscissa. For grouped data, we apparently have the same equally distanced quan-
tiles on the abscissa; therefore, the q-curve and the p-curve diﬀer with respect to their
corresponding values on the ordinate.
Consider now the q and p curves for taxes for grouped data. For the lower income
strata, the ﬁve-percent quantiles contain more taxpayers in terms of p than in terms of
q. In turn, this implies also more relative tax revenue for the p-curve as compared with
the q-curve. Hence, for the lower income strata we have F Y
T (pj)  FT(qj) for pj = qj.
This means that the tax revenue associated with upper quantiles is smaller in terms of p
than in terms of q. Hence, the p-curve for the taxes has a steeper slope than the q-curve
for the lower quantiles and a ﬂatter slope for the upper quantiles. But the q-curve can
never cut the p-curve from below in the interior of the unit square. This is easily seen:
obviously we have for the gross incomes FY(q)  p = F Y
Y (p) for q = p. Hence, for q = p
the gross income shares according to q can never exceed the gross income share according
to p. For a progressive tax schedule this implies that FT(q)  F Y
T (p) for q = p. Moreover,
note that neither curve crosses the diagonal.
Consider the q and p curves of net incomes for grouped data. For the q-curves,
basically the same reasoning applies as to Lorenz curves29 because the net income shares
increase for increasing quantiles. Hence, FY  T(qj) lies below the diagonal. For the p-
curves, basically the same reasoning applies as for the analysis of inequality (18). For the
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then (17) translates into our grouped data and, hence, inequality (18) translates into our
grouped data as well.
This means that our analyses are carried out for Deﬁnitions 1 to 6 in terms of grouped
data for qj and pj, where j = 0;1;:::;20.
Separation of tax progression with respect to the inﬂuence of the income distribution
on the one hand and the tax schedule on the other was discussed in section 3.4.2. As
concerns empirical data, we have to add another problem. Even for the case of identical
monetary units, identical support of the income distribution, and conﬁnement to the
29See Gastwirth and Glauberman (1976) for errors in estimating Lorenz curves when grouped date are
used instead of individual data.
29suﬃcient conditions, we would need the exact tax schedule to disentangle the inﬂuence
of the income distribution and the tax schedule. However, the nominal tax schedule
would not suﬃce for this purpose. We would have to capture also the administration
of a going tax schedule. All tax codes contain many tax beneﬁts, itemized deductions
from the tax base, etc. While these instances are captured by the real micro data of
taxation, they are not captured by the nominal tax schedule. Yet they constitute a
major element of real tax progression. This was also one of our reasons to use the LIS
data instead of simulated data, such as, e.g., the EUROMOD data. Hence, even under
favorable theoretical conditions, decomposition of tax progression into a term dealing
with the income distribution and a term dealing with taxation is limited by empirical
data problems.
4.3 Numerical Progression Comparisons
Categorical data of progression relationships just inform on progression dominance, bi-
furcate progression dominance, or multiple crossings of the respective curves. Curve
diﬀerences inform also on the intensities of progression dominance. We present ﬁrst our
categorical results and thereafter progression intensities for selected countries.
The categorical results of our international comparisons of tax progression are pre-
sented in Tables 2 to 7. For these tables we use the following notation:
D and d denote progression dominance: D means that the country in the row dominates
the country in the column with respect to progression; d means that the country in the
row is dominated by the country in the column with respect to progression. Note that the
entries D and d are asymmetric: a D in cell (i;j) implies a d in cell (j;i), and vice versa.
A superscript C indicates convexity or concavity of the associated relative concentration
curve, i.e, that the respective suﬃcient conditions (elasticities) of Theorems 1 to 3 hold.
R and r denote bifurcate progression: R means that the country in the row is more
progressive than the country in the column for the lower income strata and less progressive
for the upper income strata; r means that the country in the row is less progressive than
the country in the column for the lower income strata and more progressive in the upper
income strata. Note again that the entries R and r are asymmetric.
# denotes multiple changes of the progression pattern.
4.3.1 International Progression Comparisons: Categorical Summary Results
Tables 2 to 7 present the results corresponding to Deﬁnitions 1 to 6. Each cell in these
tables contains four entries: the entries in the ﬁrst line refer to household data, the entries
in the second line to equivalized data using the Luxembourg equivalence scales m  with
 = 0:5. The left-hand side entries in a cell refer to direct taxes only, while the right-hand
30side entries to direct taxes plus payroll taxes (which consist mainly of employees’ share
in social security contributions).
Inspection of the cells of Tables 2 to 7 shows that only few left-hand side and right-
hand side columns diﬀer within each cell. Disregarding the C-superscripts, which just
indicate that the respective curve diﬀerences have a unique extremum, still increases the
similarity of the columns within each cell. This means that comparative progression is
not changed much if we extend the direct taxes by payroll taxes. This is remarkable
since payroll taxes are by and large proportional to the incomes for the lower and middle
income strata. For incomes exceeding some benchmark payroll taxes on incomes beyond
this benchmark expire altogether. Moreover, for the lower income strata they are usu-
ally considerably higher than the direct taxes. This implies that they have a regressive
eﬀect on overall tax progression (for the eﬀect of payroll taxes in isolation see Peichl and
Schäfer (2008, pp. 13-4)). On top of that, their structure may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent
countries. An exceptional case is Denmark, where social security contributions are neg-
ligible, because most social expenditures are paid out of the tax revenue. Nevertheless,
our results show few diﬀerences in comparative progression for direct taxes and direct
taxes plus payroll taxes.
Basically the same observation applies to the rows within each cell. Although being
less similar than the columns, most of them have similar appearance. This means that
replacing taxes and net incomes for household data by equivalent taxes and equivalent
net incomes does not cause dramatic changes in the comparative progression pattern,
although the changes are more pronounced than comparisons between direct taxes only
and direct taxes plus payroll taxes. Note that equivalized incomes and taxes tend to be
more equally distributed than household incomes and taxes (cf. Peichl et al., 2009a,b).
Countries with a higher proportion of large households are more likely to experience
changes between the ﬁrst and the second rows in the cells of the tables.
Tables 8 to 11 survey the results of the comparisons across Deﬁnitions 1 to 6. They
show us that for international comparisons of uniform tax progression, progression domi-
nance is the rule rather than the exception. In about to two thirds of all 312 international
comparisons, uniform progression dominance holds.30 Among these cases, for between
30Note that these are the results of our numerical calculations. As our curves do not draw on the data
universe, but on samples only, the question arises whether curve crossings are statistically signiﬁcant.
Whereas Atkinson (1970, p. 258) had asserted that for comparisons among twelve countries “in only
16 out of 66 cases do the Lorenz curves not intersect”, Bishop et al. (1991a, p. 462) found statistically
signiﬁcant intersections of Lorenz curves only in three percent of all cases, whereas 97 percent of the
Lorenz curves were ranked; in contrast to that, simple numerical comparisons would have ranked only
some 75 percent of the comparisons of Lorenz curves. This result holds under the assumption that
the diﬀerences between the population Lorenz ordinate and the sample Lorenz ordinate are normally
distributed (see also Bishop et al. (1991b), who showed impressive results also for the double criterion of
Lorenz dominance and higher mean income). This means for our results that we might end up with even
more dominance relations if we required curve intersections to be statistically signiﬁcant. On the other
hand, Dardanoni and Forcina (1999) showed using Monte-Carlo simulations that the statistical power
3160.78 and 83.05 percent of progression dominance the respective curve diﬀerences have a
single extremum, which means that the suﬃcient conditions of convexity or concavity of
the associated relative concentration curves hold. However, in between 16.95 and 39.22
percent of cases do we observe that the suﬃcient conditions of Theorems 1 to 3 do not
hold, although the associated relative concentration curves do not cross the diagonal in
the unit square.
Uniform progression dominance does not hold for about one third (exactly 32.69
percent) of all cases only. Among these cases we observe between 65.38 and 84.21 percent
for which bifurcate progression holds. This means that in these situations there is a unique
benchmark such that uniform progression dominance for one country holds up to this
benchmark and reverses for the quantiles exceeding this benchmark for the other country.
With respect to all cases this means that only for between 3.85 and 11.54 percent do we not
have clear-cut patterns of progression dominance: the associated relative concentration
curves have in these cases multiple crossings with the diagonal of the unit square or,
alternatively, the respective curve diﬀerences change their sign more than once. This
is negligible as compared with the two thirds of all cases in which uniform progression
dominance holds and with more than one ﬁfth of all cases in which bifurcate progression
holds.
Progression dominance is a transitive relation. Hence, we can arrange the strict
progression dominance relationship of Tables 2 to 7 in terms of Hasse diagrams, which are
presented in Figures 3 to 26. We have Hasse diagrams for each of our six deﬁnitions and
each of our four data sets, which produces 24 ﬁgures. At the top of these ﬁgures we ﬁnd the
countries with the highest progression dominance, at the bottom those countries which
are progression dominated by most other countries, but do not progression dominate
other countries. Except for Figures 5, 11, 17, and 23, we ﬁnd Switzerland and Poland
at the bottom, and Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom in the
lower parts of the ﬁgures. At the top we ﬁnd Germany, the United States, Australia,
Canada, and the Netherlands. Only Figures 5, 11, 17, and 23 put everything upside
down. All these ﬁgures concern Deﬁnition 3, which turns out as an outlier among our six
deﬁnitions. This phenomenon will subsequently crop up also in our other ﬁndings.
4.3.2 International Progression Comparisons: Consistency among Progres-
sion Concepts
Tables 12 and 13 report the robustness of progression comparisons across our six deﬁni-
tions. These tables show us that full consistency is rather rare: it varies between 2.56
and 8.97 percent for progression dominance31 and between 5.13 and 15.38 percent for
of the Lorenz curve as a test device is low. However, in the present paper our focus is on the numerical
analysis. The respective statistical tests will be conducted in our future research.
31A 100 percent full consistency for a set of deﬁnitions would mean that any one deﬁnition out of
this set can represent the rest, while the rest would become superﬂuous because all measure the same
32bifurcate progression. Note that full consistency is highest for taxes plus payroll taxes for
equivalized data. However, when we look for at least four consistencies, the consistency
rates increase to numbers between 34.64 and 48.71 percent for progression dominance
and to numbers between 62.22 and 70.52 percent for bifurcate progression.
Table 14 contains rough indications of similarities and dissimilarities among the pro-
gression comparison concepts.32 This table is based on pairwise comparisons of the entries
in Tables 2 to 7 counting the dominance and bifurcate relationships which are identical
between pairs of tables. The ﬁrst entries in the cells of Table 14 contain the percentages
(as averages of all four datasets) of congruence of the respective D’s and R’s in the cells of
the pairs of the compared tables, the second entries contain the percentages (as averages
of all four datasets) of cases in which a D or R is not matched by the respective symbol in
the other table.33 Multiple crossings were ignored. We observe strong similarity of 83.66
percent between Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, although Deﬁnition 1 is expressed in terms of q and
Deﬁnition 2 in terms of p; note that both concern deﬁnitions in terms of taxes. Strong
similarities are also observed between Deﬁnitions 1 and 4 (63.46 percent), Deﬁnitions 1
and 5 (65.06 percent), Deﬁnitions 2 and 4 (60.90 percent), Deﬁnitions 2 and 5 (67.62
percent), Deﬁnitions 4 and 6 (69.23 percent), and Deﬁnitions 5 and 6 (58.97 percent).
The similarities between Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 on the one hand, and Deﬁnitions 5 on the
other, can be explained by their common casting in terms of taxes. The similarities be-
tween Deﬁnitions 4 and 6 can be explained because they are cast in terms of net incomes.
However, the similarities between Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 on the one hand, and Deﬁnition 4
on the other would not have been expected a priori because Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 are cast
in terms of taxes and Deﬁnition 4 is cast in terms of net incomes. Moreover, Deﬁnition
1 is based on q, whereas Deﬁnitions 4 is based on p. Hence, Table 14 suggests that we
have two (overlapping) similarity clusters: Deﬁnitions 1, 2, 4, and 5 on the one hand, and
Deﬁnitions 4, 5, and 6 on the other. This is also conﬁrmed upon checking higher-order
consistencies (not reported in the present text).
Table 14 demonstrates also the particularity of Deﬁnition 3, which has very high
rates of dissimilarity with the other deﬁnitions. It behaves as a complete outlier, which
indicates that it measures phenomena which are dissimilar as compared with the other
deﬁnitions. Interestingly enough, even Deﬁnition 4, which is, on theoretical grounds, the
one most related to Deﬁnition 3, exhibits lower dissimilarity rates with respect to all
other deﬁnitions than does Deﬁnition 3.
Let us for a moment set aside Deﬁnition 3 and concentrate on the other deﬁnitions.
When looking at Tables 2-3 and 6-7 as well as at Figures 3-26 (except Figures 5, 11,
phenomenon. Hence, less than full consistency justiﬁes a multiple of measures for progression comparisons
because all measure diﬀerent traits.
32Note that consistency between our deﬁnitions depends on the data used. Hence, the present analysis
reﬂects the data used for this study.
33Note that we consider a pair of deﬁnitions similar if it is either D or R [d or r], but not the opposite
(];d;r) [];D;R], respectively.
3317, and 23), it is striking to see that “high tax” (as conventionally perceived) countries
like Sweden and Denmark, medium tax countries like the United Kingdom, and low
tax countries like Switzerland and Poland are all classiﬁed as less progressive than most
other countries. Furthermore, high tax countries like Germany, medium tax countries like
France, and low tax countries like the United States are classiﬁed as more progressive
than most other countries. This is because the measures in this paper are developed
for comparing uniform tax progression, not the level of taxation. Sweden and Denmark
have taxes that reach a high percentage of income rather fast and remain there, which is
more akin to proportional taxation; the same pattern applies to the United Kingdom for
a medium tax burden, and to Switzerland and Poland for a low tax burden. In contrast
to that, the income interval for which taxation is steadily increasing as a percentage of
income is comparatively extensive in Germany, in France, and in the United States. This
explains their dominance with respect to comparisons of tax progression. For similar
results using another approach see Peichl and Schäfer (2008, pp. 8-12).
Let us now focus on the discrepancy between Deﬁnition 3 and the other deﬁnitions.
To illustrate, we single out the case of Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 which have a high inconsistency
rate of 71.47 percent according to Table 14, although both deﬁnitions should be closely
related on theoretical grounds.
First of all we check whether both deﬁnitions can command plausibility. They can: if
FY 1 T1(qk) > FY 2 T2(qk) for all qk; 0 < qk < 1, then the qk  100 percent of the lowest
income recipients have relatively higher aggregate net income under (Y 1;T 1) than under
(Y 1;T 2); if F Y
Y 1 T1(pk) > F Y
Y 2 T2(pk) for all pk; 0 < pk < 1, then the pk  100 percent of
the recipients of the lowest aggregate gross income have relatively higher aggregate net
income under (Y 1;T 1) than under (Y 1;T 2). Hence, both deﬁnitions stand a plausibility
test.
Consider now the cells US/CH in Tables 4 and 5. They show for all four entries
that Switzerland has higher uniform progression than the United States according to
Deﬁnition 3, whereas the United States has higher uniform progression than Switzerland
according to Deﬁnition 4. Let us start with the ﬁctitious assumption that, for whatever
reasons, Switzerland had an equal distribution of gross incomes and a proportional tax,
whereas gross and net incomes were unequally distributed in the United States. Then
we know from Section 3.4.1 that both FY CH TCH(qk) and F Y
Y CH TCH(pk) are equal to the
diagonal of the unit square, the ﬁrst by the assumptions of an equal distribution of gross
incomes and a proportional tax, and the second by the assumption of a proportional tax.
However, this case implies higher uniform progression of the income-distribution-cum-
tax system in Switzerland than in the United States according to Deﬁnition 3 and higher
uniform progression in the United States than in Switzerland according to Deﬁnition 4.
Hence, in this case Deﬁnition 4 is accurate, while Deﬁnition 3 is misleading. For moderate
tax progression in one country (in this case: Switzerland) and higher tax progression in
another country (in this case: the United States), this misleading statement of Deﬁnition
343 seems to translate to cases for which the distribution of gross incomes in one country
(Switzerland) is suﬃciently more equally distributed than in another country (United
States).
Suppose now that the population principle applies and that the same distribution of
gross incomes holds in both countries.34 Then
(19) FY  T1(qk)  FY  T2(qk) , F
Y
Y  T1(pk)  F
Y
Y  T2(pk);
if T 1() is more progressive than T 2(). Note that expression (19) follows immediately
from Section 3.4.1.35 Hence, Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 are equivalent for identical gross income
distributions and greater progression depends only on the tax schedules involved.
Let us now consider another extreme case, viz. total progression. A totally progressive
tax schedule consists of just two marginal tax rates, +100% and  100%.36 All incomes
above mean income are taxed away and all incomes below mean income are replenished
by transfers up to mean income. Hence, the net income distribution is equal. Suppose,
Switzerland had a totally progressive tax schedule, while the United States had some
more common progressive tax schedule. Then Deﬁnition 3 correctly indicates higher
progression for Switzerland than for the United States. So does Deﬁnition 4, since CH =
















Therefore, it seems that the ostensibly deviant behavior of Deﬁnition 3 results from
its high sensitivity to the inﬂuence of the distribution of gross incomes, which may easily
overcompensate the inﬂuence of the tax schedule and lead to implausible results. In
contrast to Deﬁnition 3, Deﬁnition 4 is less susceptible to the preponderance of the
distribution of gross incomes vis-á-vis the tax schedule. Hence, Deﬁnition 3 has to be
taken with some caution. It is too sensitive with respect to more equal distributions of
net incomes irrespective of how they came about.
4.3.3 International Progression Comparisons: Progression Intensities for Se-
lected Countries
Tables 2 to 7 contain categorical data only; they just report whether we have uniform
progression dominance, bifurcate progression or multiple crossings of the associated rela-
34Switzerland’s population is about two percent of the population of the United States. An equal
income distribution in both countries in discrete terms requires therefore 50 income clones in the United
States for each Swiss income recipient. Take an income distribution consisting of one representative out
of the 50 US clones, then both income distributions are identical under the population principle.
35The second part of expression (19) may not seem immediate. Consider FY
Y  T 1(pk)  FY
Y  T 2(pk).
Then there corresponds a unique qk to each pk (recall that qk  pk). Since the same set of taxpayers
has higher relative aggregate net income under pk for T1, it must also have higher relative aggregate net
income under qk for T1, as the distribution of gross incomes is the same.
36Note that for several reasons we exclude negative taxes for most of our analysis. We use this example
35tive concentration curves. They are silent about the intensity of progression comparisons.
Information about this aspect is provided by the 312 graphs of international progression
comparisons, where each graph corresponds to one out of the four entries in each cell
of Tables 2 to 7 and contains six curves corresponding to the six concepts of compari-
son of progression as embodied in these six tables. From this set we single out sixteen
for presentation in this paper, of which four cover the comparisons between the United
Kingdom and the United States, four the comparisons between Germany and the United
Kingdom, four the comparisons between Germany and the United States, and four the
comparison between Germany and Sweden.
United Kingdom versus United States Figure 27 depicts the progression compar-
isons for UK 1999 versus US 2000 for the direct taxes and household data. In accordance
with Tables 2 to 7 we see that the US progression dominates the UK for all deﬁnitions
except Deﬁnition 3. For Deﬁnition 3 tax progression is at ﬁrst higher in the UK than
in the US and switches at q = 0:55 to higher progression for the US than for the UK.
Moreover, note that the curves for Deﬁnitions 3, 4, and 6 show much weaker intensity
than progression dominance according to the other deﬁnitions.
Figure 28 depicts the progression comparisons for UK 1999 versus US 2000 for the
direct taxes plus payroll taxes and household data. The pattern is the same as for Figure
27 except that the inclusion of payroll taxes now makes the intensity of progression
somewhat less pronounced, as the entries on the ordinate show. Figure 29 depicts the
progression comparisons for UK 1999 versus US 2000 for the equivalized direct taxes and
equivalized incomes. In accordance with Tables 2 to 7 we see that the US progression
dominates the UK for all deﬁnitions except Deﬁnition 3. For Deﬁnition 3 tax progression
is uniformly higher in the UK than in the US. Figure 30 repeats this pattern for equivalized
direct taxes plus payroll taxes and equivalized incomes.
Germany versus United Kingdom Figure 31 depicts the progression comparisons
for Germany 2000 versus UK 1999 for direct taxes and household data. In accordance
with Tables 2 to 7 we see that German progression dominates the progression in the
United Kingdom for all deﬁnitions.
Figure 32 depicts the progression comparisons for Germany 2000 versus UK 1999 for
the direct taxes plus payroll taxes and household data. Uniformly greater progression
for Germany vis-á-vis the UK is again observed for all deﬁnitions except Deﬁnition 1.
For Deﬁnition 1, Germany is more progressive except for the highest 15 percentiles, for
which progression switches to the UK. Note that the ordering of progression dominance
changes when going from direct taxes to direct and payroll taxes: progression dominance
according to Deﬁnition 3 is moderate for direct taxes, but becomes far more pronounced
for direct and payroll taxes, possibly because payroll taxes render the German distribution
here to compare equally distributed net incomes resulting from unequally distributed gross incomes.
36of net incomes more unequal. Progression dominance according to Deﬁnitions 1, 2, and
5 becomes less pronounced for direct and payroll taxes (Deﬁnition 1 even acts partly in
the direction of less progression for Germany). Figures 33 and 34 repeat this pattern also
for the equivalized data.
Germany versus United States Figure 35 shows higher progression of the German
income-distribution-cum-tax system for Deﬁnitions 2, 3, and 5 (except the 95
th percentile)
for direct taxes. Deﬁnitions 4 and 6 do not bear a pronounced message. Deﬁnition 1
indicates higher progression for Germany up to q 2 (0:6;0:65) and higher progression for
the United States for the upper income strata.
With respect to direct and payroll taxes, Figure 36 shows higher progression for
Germany only for Deﬁnition 3, whereas Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 indicate higher progression
for the United States. Deﬁnition 5 indicates higher progression for Germany up to q 2
(0:55;0:6) and higher progression for the United States for the upper income strata. These
shifts reﬂect the inﬂuence of the higher importance of payroll taxes in Germany. Again
Deﬁnitions 4 and 6 do not bear a pronounced message.
The equivalized data in Figures 37 and 38 completely repeat the pattern of Figures
35 and 36, respectively.
Germany versus Sweden It is interesting to compare Germany and Sweden, as Swe-
den is notorious for her high tax burden. Figure 39 shows progression comparison for
direct taxes and household data. We see that Germany is uniformly more progressive
for Deﬁnitions 1, 2, and 5. The other deﬁnitions are of no major importance; they also
indicate slightly more progression for Germany. This pattern is repeated for direct taxes
and payroll taxes in Figure 40, but now with only about half the intensity as for Figure
39 (compare the entries on the ordinates).
This pattern is repeated also for the equivalized data in Figures 41 and 42, except that
Sweden appears now slightly more progressive according to Deﬁnition 3, which might be
a reﬂection of larger family sizes in Sweden.
Hence, the general picture exhibits greater progression in Germany as compared to
Sweden, although Sweden’s relative tax burden is higher than Germany’s.37
4.3.4 Intertemporal Progression Comparisons
We have data for intertemporal progression comparisons for all selected countries except
France. However, because of space limitations we restrict ourselves here to just three
37Eurostat, Tables tec00018 and tec00019, tell us the percentages of taxes from income and wealth and
social security contributions (in square brackets; employees’ and employers’ contributions taken together)
of GDP for 2008 (selected ﬁgures): EU 27 mean 13.1 [13.7]; EU 15 mean 13.5 [13.9]; Belgium 16.6 [16.1];
United Kingdom 16.7 [8.4]; Sweden 17.4 [12.00]; Finland 17.5 [12.2]; Iceland 18.3 [2.8]; Norway 22.0 [8.9];
Denmark 29.8 [1.8]. The ﬁgures for Germany are 11.3 [16.4]. This shows that Germany is a low-tax
country with respect to income and wealth taxes and a high-tax country with respect to social security
37countries, viz. the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Of course, we
could cover only periods for which full sets of comparable data are available. The conﬁnes
of data availability precludes too long time intervals.38 Interestingly enough, the curve
diﬀerences for intertemporal progression comparisons have much lower intensity than
the curve diﬀerences for international progression comparisons. They are in the order
of between one ﬁfth and one tenth of the curve diﬀerences for international progression
comparisons. This fact is somewhat obscured by curve calibration, but may readily be
seen from the ordinates of the respective ﬁgures.
United States For the United States we have data of waves 1991, 1994, 2000, and
2004. Wave 1991 was in the mid-term of the Bush Senior Administration (1989-93). In his
election campaign, Bush Senior had promised: “Read my lips: no new taxes.” However,
he broke his election pledge, it seems for ﬁnancing the ﬁrst Iraq War, and was not re-
elected. Waves 1994 and 2000 concern the Clinton Administration (1993-2001). Clinton
took over oﬃce on January 20, 1993, which ended on January 20, 2001. Clinton was very
successful in reducing budget deﬁcits, promoting NAFTA, and getting on good terms with
China and Russia. On August 5, 1997, Clinton signed the Tax Relief Act, which meant
a signiﬁcant tax cut eﬀective as of January 1, 1998. Moreover, his administration was
a peaceful period. The very end of his administration was overshadowed by the dotcom
crisis. Wave 2004 concerns the fourth year of the Bush Junior administration. Bush
Junior and Cheney were supposed of favoring the upper income strata of the American
society. Moreover, this period was overshadowed by the second Iraq War, which was
largely ﬁnanced by high budget deﬁcits. Hence, the progression changes 1991/94 (Bush
Senior to Clinton), 1994/2000 (beginning and end of the Clinton Administration), and
2000/04 (Clinton to Bush Junior) are of interest.
Table 15 provides a concise summary on the categorical data of comparisons of tax
progression. We use the following notation: Bsen means “Bush Senior”, C* means “Clin-
ton 1994”, C** means “Clinton 2000”, and Bjun means “Bush Junior”. An arrow means
that the ﬁrst entry is taken as a starting point and the second entry as the end point
of the comparison. For instance, the entry d [D] under 91!94 and Bsen ! C*, respec-
tively, means that the tax system in 1991 under the Bush Senior Administration was
less progressive [more progressive] than in 1994 under the Clinton Administration. The
ﬁrst three double columns in Table 15 concern the comparisons over adjoining periods,
the second three double columns concern comparisons over longer periods. The twelve
Figures 43 to 54 are the associated graphs for the ﬁrst three double columns of Table 15.
The remaining graphs are available from the authors upon request.
contributions; as concerns social security contributions, it is topped only by France [17.9] among all 25
member countries of the EU and the two associated countries Iceland and Norway.
38Piketty and Saez (2003) and Piketty (2003) endeavored to study income inequality for extremely long
periods, relying on income tax data. As income taxes aﬀected in their ﬁrst decades only the top income
strata, they had to conﬁne their investigations to the top income decile of the respective countries.
38Since Table 15 contains categorical data only, we draw on Figures 43 to 46. They ex-
hibit a higher progression for 1991 than for 1994 for Deﬁnition 3 and a higher progression
for 1994 than for 1991 for Deﬁnition 1. Deﬁnitions 2 and 5 (this one for the upper income
strata) also tend to higher progression for 1994 than for 1991. The other deﬁnitions show
no major progression intensity. The deviant behavior of Deﬁnition 3 may be a reﬂection
of a slightly more equal distribution of gross incomes in 1991 than in 1994.
The picture of the comparison C* ! C** (see Figures 47 to 50) is less clear-cut. The
graphical picture is rather disparate. Whereas Deﬁnitions 2 (for the upper income strata)
and 3 signal higher progression for 1994 than for 2000, Deﬁnition 1 signals for the upper
income strata a higher progression for 2000 than for 1994. The lower progression for
2000 according to Deﬁnition 3 signals a more equal distribution of gross incomes in 2000
than in 1994. Deﬁnition 1 signals a more progressive tax schedule in 2000 than in 1994,
which seems to have overcompensated the more equal distribution of gross incomes. The
relative shift of aggregate income from the upper to the lower income strata due to a more
equal gross income distribution seems to have overcompensated the more progressive tax
schedule in 2000 according to Deﬁnition 2. But, taken as a whole, the Clinton 1997
tax reform did not dramatically change the pattern of tax progression. It was a more a
general tax cut than a change of tax progression. Thus, the Clinton 1997 tax reform did
not beneﬁt the lower income strata in relative terms.
The picture of the comparison C** ! Bjun (see Figures 51 to 54) shows uniformly
less progression for 2004 as compared to 2000 for Deﬁnitions 3, 4, and 6. Note that these
three deﬁnitions are cast in terms of net incomes. As concerns the deﬁnitions in terms of
taxes, the picture is disparate. For Deﬁnitions 1, 2, and 5 there are crossings for direct
taxes and household data, but by and large greater progression for 2000 than for 2004
for household data and direct and payroll taxes. For equivalized data and direct taxes
Deﬁnitions 1, 2, and 5 indicate less progression in 2000 than in 2004, whereas they do
not provide a clear-cur picture for equivalized data and direct taxes and payroll taxes.
Remeber, however, the small intensity of progression for intertemporal comparisons.
Concerning other comparisons, we refer to the last three columns of Table 15. The
progression between the two Bush Administrations show either more progression under
Bush Senior (Deﬁnition 3), or for Deﬁnitions 1 (direct taxes and payroll taxes), 5, and
6 lower progression for the upper income strata under Bush Junior. Concerning early
Clinton to Bush Junior, we ﬁnd either generally less progression under Bush Junior, or
less progression for the upper income strata. The comparison between Bush Senior and
late Clinton does not provide an explicit picture.
United Kingdom For the United Kingdom we have data of the waves 1991, 1995, 1999,
and 2004. With respect to ﬁscal policy, the last two years before 1991 witnessed Margaret
Thatcher’s unfortunate replacement of local community taxes by a poll tax, called “com-
munity charge”. It was introduced in Scotland in 1989 and in England and Wales in 1990.
39It led to serious unrest among the population: in March 31, 1990, there was a demonstra-
tion on Trafalgar Square with more than 100,000 protesters. Margaret Thatcher, who
became Prime Minister on May 4, 1979, resigned on November 28, 1990. Her successor
became John Major, whose terms of oﬃce ended on May 2, 1997. The United Kingdom
slid into an economic recession in the period 1990-3. In addition the Black Wednesday
on September 16, 1992, occurred during the Major Government: by short selling ster-
ling, George Soros succeeded in a sweeping speculation against the British Pound, which
caused a loss of £3.4 billion for Britain. On January 27, 1991, Britain participated in the
Gulf War joining the UNO forces with 53,462 soldiers. Major succeeded in overcoming
Britain’s economic recession: the number of unemployed had decreased from 3 million
in 1993 to 2 million in 1996. However, Major had problems with the “Euro-Rebels” in
his party. After a catastrophic loss of the Conservatives in the 1997 elections, Major
resigned. His follower was Tony Blair of the Labour Party. His oﬃce extended from
May 2, 1997, to June 27, 2007. He was Prime Minister for the three periods 1997-2001,
2001-5, 2005-7. Blair increased public expenditure for education and health-care; at the
same time he planned to reduce budget deﬁcits. After his victory in the 2001 elections he
increased taxes. In 2003 he sided the Bush Junior Administration in the Iraq War with
46,000 soldiers, about one third of Britain’s military force. Blair introduced minimum
wages and reforms to strengthen the private sector of the British economy. Because of
incorrect information of the public concerning the reasons for participating in the Iraq
War, Blair had to resign.
Table 16 shows rather clear-cut results: for most three double columns, viz. 95!99,
99!04, and 91!04, we observe less progresion of the tax system for the later year,
with the notorious exception of Deﬁnition 3 for the two last periods. As Table 16 is
explicit enough for these cases, we can dispense with presenting the respective graphs.
The situation is more intricate for the change from Thatcher to Major, viz. 91!95:
Figures 55 to 58 impart the impression of less progression for the 1995 tax system than
for 1991. This appears for household data and for Deﬁnitions 1, 2, and 5, but not for
equivalized data. Deﬁnition 3 shows lower progression in 1991 for the lower income strata
for household data; it shows higher progression in 1991 throughout for equivalized data.
Germany For Germany we have data of the waves 1989, 1994, and 2000. In Germany,
there was a big tax reform extending from 1986 to 1990 (see Seidl and Kaletha (1987)).
Hence, 1989 was the last year before the end of the tax reform. November 9, 1989, was the
date of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thereafter the German Democratic Republic existed
until October 3, 1990, when the German uniﬁcation took place. Hence, 1989 was the last
year before the 1986-90 tax reform was completed, and the last year of West Germany as
a self-contained state. Kohl had become Chancellor of Germany on October 1, 1982, and
resigned on October 27, 1998, after an electoral defeat. Then Schröder succeeded him in
oﬃce. Kohl had survived the 1994 elections as chancellor only after severe electoral losses.
40For the purpose of ﬁnancing the German uniﬁcation, a solidarity surcharge on top of the
income tax was introduced on July 1, 1991, and expired on June 30, 1992. It amounted
to 7.5 percent of the income tax. As the German uniﬁcation proved more expensive than
originally anticipated, it was reintroduced in 1995 amounting again to 7.5 percent of the
income tax; in 1997 it was reduced to 5.5 percent. The top tax rate for business income
was reduced to 47 percent as of January 1, 1994. In 1997, another tax reform was enacted
(see Seidl and Traub (1997)). On July 6, 2000, the German Parliament enacted another
tax reform extending from January 1, 2001 to January 1, 2005.
Germany shows us a development opposite to that of the United Kingdom. Whereas in
the United Kingdom the tax system became less progressive in later time, the German tax
system became more progressive in the lapse of time. Except some negligible intersections
and except Deﬁnition 3, the Figures 59 to 70 show that the German tax system became
between 1989 and 2000 more progressive for the lower income strata and less progressive
for the upper income strata. Deﬁnition 3 makes here again for its notorious exception.
Thus, in spite of all reforms to cut minimum and top marginal tax rates, the German
tax system had become more progressive in the period 1989 to 2000, at least for the
lower income strata; interestingly enough, it had also partly become less progressive for
the upper income strata for taxes plus payroll taxes. This reﬂects that the cuts in top
marginal tax rates for the high income strata overcompensated the relative increase in
social security contributions which had taken place in this time period.
4.4 Equivalence Scales Matter
Finally we checked the inﬂuence of equivalence scales on uniform tax progression. For
this purpose we started with choosing  = 0:25 for the LIS equivalence scale m  and
let  increase to 0.5 and further to 0.75. It is interesting to see that equivalence scales
do indeed matter for comparisons of greater tax progression. Interestingly enough, the
curve diﬀerences for progression comparisons for equivalence scales have, akin to the
curve diﬀerences for intertemporal progression comparisons, much lower intensity than
for international progression comparisons. They are in the order of between one ﬁfth and
one tenth of the curve diﬀerences for international progression comparisons. This fact is
somewhat obscured by curve calibration, but may readily be seen from the ordinates of
the respective ﬁgures.
We investigated the inﬂuence of the eﬀects of diﬀerent values of the scale parameter
 on progression comparisons. We selected the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Germany, and checked the eﬀects of choosing 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 for . We present
selected graphs in Figures 71 to 96. The graphs diﬀer both from country to country and
for diﬀerent comparisons within a country. Interestingly enough, we observe particular
patterns of progression comparisons for certain parameter combinations which are rather
robust for diﬀerent time periods within a country.
Concerning the United States, Figures 71 to 78 show characteristic patterns of pro-
41gression comparisons for diﬀerent parameter pairs. Figures 71 to 74 depict progression
changes of  = 0:25 versus  = 0:50. Whereas the graphs for 1991 and 1994 show
a trapezoidal shape with the curves of Deﬁnitions 1 and 3 largely at the frontiers, the
graphs for 2000 and 2004 show the shape of a bath tub with all curves decreasing for the
lower quantiles and increasing for the higher quantiles. The curves for  = 0:50 versus
 = 0:75 and  = 0:25 versus  = 0:75 are pear-shaped with the graph of Deﬁnition 3 at
the upper and the graph of Deﬁnition 1 at the lower frontier (see Figures 75 to 78).
For the United Kingdom we observe again bath-tub-shaped curve families for  = 0:25
versus  = 0:50 (see Figures 79 to 81). The curve families for  = 0:50 versus  = 0:75
are basically also pear-shaped with the curve of Deﬁnition 3 largely at the top and the
curve of Deﬁnition 1 largely at the bottom, but the pears are more clumsy than the
ones for the United States; in particular they have a thicker end with reversed roles of
Deﬁnitions 1 and 3. The curve families for  = 0:25 versus  = 0:75 are butterﬂy-shaped
with Deﬁnition 1 representing the upper frontier for the lower quantiles and the lower
frontier for the upper quantiles. Deﬁnition 3 has exactly the opposite pattern (see Figures
86 to 88).
For Germany we observe again bath-tub-shaped curve families for  = 0:25 versus
 = 0:50, the curve of Deﬁnition 1 making largely for the top and the curve for Deﬁnition
3 by and large for the bottom (see Figures 89 to 91). The curve families for  = 0:50
versus  = 0:75 are basket-cap-shaped rather than pear-shaped. They show several curve
intersections with most curves decreasing except the curve of Deﬁnition 3 (see Figures
92 and 93). The curve families for  = 0:25 versus  = 0:75 also look a bit like being
butterﬂy-shaped, although this picture is disturbed by the curve of Deﬁnition 2 (see
Figures 94 to 96).
Thus, we can draw the conclusion that equivalence scales matter for progression com-
parisons, although it is not easy to discover a general pattern of their mode of operation.
Their inﬂuence changes between countries and between the pairs of scale parameter val-
ues which are juxtaposed. It is in particular this last inﬂuence which is perhaps the most
robust behavioral pattern of the inﬂuence of equivalence scales on progression compari-
sons.
5 Conclusion
This paper starts with a concise review of methods of measuring and comparing tax
progression. Local measures of tax progression suﬀer from their neglect of the income
distribution, global measures of tax progression suﬀer from the disadvantage of all ag-
gregation, viz. that much information is lost in the aggregation procedure, and uniform
comparisons of tax progression suﬀer from their assumption that the same income distri-
bution has to hold for all situations to be compared. Based on uniform comparisons of tax
progression, Seidl (1994) proposed that, instead of comparing tax schedules and income
42distributions in terms of incomes, they should be compared in terms of population and
income quantiles. This approach replaces the diﬀerent supports of income distributions
by the distributions of population or income quantiles, whose support is the unit interval.
This allows constructing relative concentration curves and curve diﬀerences by using the
same values of population or income quantiles for the situations to be compared.
We use this approach in empirical research. We investigate uniform tax progression
comparing 13 countries from the LIS database, which have, of course, diﬀerent tax and
payroll tax schedules, as well as diﬀerent income distributions. We employ six diﬀerent
measurement devices of progression comparison, three in terms of taxes and three in terms
of net incomes. Our analyses are carried out for household data and for equivalized data
using the Luxembourg equivalence scale with parameter value  = 0:5. Although we
expected more intricate patterns to be the case rather than dominance relations, we
observe uniformly greater tax progression in about two thirds of all cases. Out of these
cases about two thirds can be thought of (in continuous terms) as having convex or
concave relative concentration curves, which means that for those cases the suﬃcient
conditions of Theorems 1 to 3 hold (see Figure 1). In terms of ﬁrst-order or second-order
curve diﬀerences this case is represented by a single extremum. For about one third
of those cases we observe progression dominance without concavity or convexity of the
associated relative concentration curves. In terms of ﬁrst-order or second-order curve
diﬀerences, this case is represented by non-intersections , with the abscissa and multiple
extrema of the respective curve diﬀerences. For about one ﬁfth of all cases we observe
bifurcate progression, i.e., higher progression for one country up to a certain threshold
and higher progression for the other country beyond this threshold. Only for about one
tenth of all international comparisons do we observe interlaced progression patterns.
Note that the proposed methodology compares tax progression, not the level of the tax
burden. This means that not all high-tax countries dominate with respect to progression.
This is in particular the case for Scandinavian countries which reach a high tax level
already at comparatively modest incomes; hence, their tax schedules do not emerge as
notedly progressive. On the other hand, low-tax countries like the United States and
high-tax countries like Germany emerge as rather progressive because the increase in
taxation extends over longer intervals. Based on actual data, some of the progression
concepts show consistencies. This is in particular the case for Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, but
also, and to a lesser extent, for Deﬁnitions 1 on the one hand, and Deﬁnitions 4 and 5 on
the other. Consistency is also observed for Deﬁnition 2 on the one hand, and Deﬁnitions
4 and 5 on the other. Other consistencies are registered between Deﬁnitions 4 and 6.
We observed two clusters of high consistency, one comprising Deﬁnitions 1, 2, 4, and
5, and another one comprising Deﬁnitions 4, 5, and 6 (see Section 3.3). Deﬁnition 3
jars with the other deﬁnitions; it has high rates of dissimilarity. It is remarkable that
Deﬁnition 3 is at variance even with Deﬁnition 4, although both are deﬁned in terms
of net incomes. Formulations in terms of income quantiles seem to be more compliant
43both among themselves and among the other progression concepts except Deﬁnition 3.
Tables 2 to 7 show the categorical data of international comparisons of tax progression.
The strict progression dominance relationships are arranged in terms of Hasse diagrams
in the 24 Figures 3 to 26.
This is followed by sixteen graphs for comparisons among the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and among Germany and Sweden. We see that, except
for Deﬁnition 3, both Germany and the United States have more progressive tax systems
than the United Kingdom. For progression comparisons between Germany and the United
States, we ﬁnd clear tendencies indicating higher progression for Germany than for the
United States. Comparing Germany and Sweden shows by and large greater progression
for Germany, although Sweden has the higher tax level. In several cases we observe
bifurcate progression, or multiple crossings with the abscissa. Progression comparison in
this case depends very much on the data set and on the progression concept applied.
Then we conduct intertemporal comparisons of tax progression for the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Germany. We did not ﬁnd a clear-cut picture for the period
1991 to 2004 for the United states except a weak tendency towards less progression for
the upper income strata under the Bush Junior Administration. The developments in
the United Kingdom and in Germany are more clear-cut: while the tax system became
less progressive in the United Kingdom in the lapse of time, it became more progressive
in Germany except the highest income stratum.
Finally, we investigate the inﬂuence of the equivalence scales on comparisons of tax
progression. We observe rather diﬀerent eﬀects of changes of the parameter values of
the equivalence scale depending on the country and, within a country, on the parameter
values of the equivalence scales considered. There seems to be an antagonistic inﬂuence of
Deﬁnitions 1 and 3 with respect to the scale parameter. The curve families of progression
comparisons are by and large bath-tub-shaped or trapezoidal-shaped for  = 0:25 versus
 = 0:50, pear-shaped or basket-cap-shaped for  = 0:50 versus  = 0:75, and pear-
shaped or butterﬂy-shaped for  = 0:25 versus  = 0:75. This seems to be a rather robust
pattern which can be observed for diﬀerent countries and, even more so, for diﬀerent time
periods within the same country. More general patterns are diﬃcult to discover.
Hence, this paper shows that diﬀerent tax schedules and diﬀerent income distributions
are no obstacle to international and intertemporal comparisons of tax progression in
terms of dominance relations. This approach enables more detailed judgments than, for
instance, global measures of tax progression. Uniform comparisons of tax progression
inform about the structure of tax progression, e.g., whether the tax system of a country
or a time period is more progressive at the lower or at the upper end of the income strata,
or whether it dominates the tax system of another country or period throughout. On top
of this categorical information, our graphs of pairwise country or time period comparisons
also provide cardinal information about the intensity of greater or smaller tax progression
in terms of the shape of the respective curves and the areas below these curves.
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58Table 14: (Dis)Similarities among progression comparison concepts
Deﬁnition 2 Deﬁnition 3 Deﬁnition 4 Deﬁnition 5 Deﬁnition 6
Deﬁnition 1 83.66 13.46 20.51 78.52 63.46 35.26 65.06 33.02 49.36 50.00
Deﬁnition 2 - 21.16 78.52 60.90 36.54 67.62 29.81 45.83 52.88
Deﬁnition 3 . - 27.88 71.47 46.16 53.52 48.72 50.64
Deﬁnition 4 . . - 51.92 47.12 69.23 26.60
Deﬁnition 5 . . . - 58.97 40.06
Legend. The ﬁrst [second] entry in a cell denotes the average percentage of similarity
[dissimilarity] between a pair of deﬁnitions. Symmetric entries are indicated by the dot
sign (.)
Table 15: US progression dominance for Bush sen., Clinton, and Bush jun.
91!94 94!00 00!04 91!04 91!00 94!04
Bsen ! C* C* ! C** C** ! Bjun Bsen ! Bjun Bsen ! C** C* ! Bjun
dC dC R # # # d d R d R #
Def. 1
R dC R R dC r R R R R R R
d d # D # # # # # # # D
Def. 2
r d # # r r # # # # # #
DC DC DC DC D D DC DC DC DC DC DC
Def. 3
DC DC r r D D DC DC # D D DC
d d r r DC D # D r r D D
Def. 4
d d r r DC D # # r r # D
R R D D R # R R R R # D
Def. 5
R R # # R # R R R R # #
dC dC dC dC DC DC R R d dC D D
Def. 6
dC dC dC dC D D R R dC dC # D
59Table 16: UK progression dominance for Thatcher, Major, and Blair
91!95 95!99 99!04 91!04
Th!Ma Ma! Bl* Bl* ! Bl** Th ! Bl**
R # DC R D D DC DC
Def. 1
# r DC R D D D D
r r DC DC D D D D
Def. 2
r r D D D D DC DC
# r DC DC # # # #
Def. 3
D # r r # # # #
# r DC R D D D D
Def. 4
# r D # D D D D
# r DC DC DC DC DC D
Def. 5
# # DC D DC D DC D
# d DC DC D D DC D
Def. 6
# # D R DC D DC D
Table 17: German progression dominance for Kohl and Schröder
89!94 94!00 89!00
K*! K** K** ! S K* ! S
r # d d dC dC
Def. 1
r r d d dC r
r r r r r r
Def. 2
r # r r r r
R # r r r r
Def. 3
DC D # # D D
D # r r # r
Def. 4
D # r r # r
# # d # d #
Def. 5
# # # d # #
D # d d # #
Def. 6
D # d d # #
60Figure 3: Progression dominance for direct taxes and household data: Deﬁnition 1
Figure 4: Progression dominance for direct taxes and household data: Deﬁnition 2
61Figure 5: Progression dominance for direct taxes and household data: Deﬁnition 3
Figure 6: Progression dominance for direct taxes and household data: Deﬁnition 4
62Figure 7: Progression dominance for direct taxes and household data: Deﬁnition 5
Figure 8: Progression dominance for direct taxes and household data: Deﬁnition 6
63Figure 9: Progression dominance for direct and payroll taxes and household data: Deﬁ-
nition 1
Figure 10: Progression dominance for direct and payroll taxes and household data: Def-
inition 2
64Figure 11: Progression dominance for direct and payroll taxes and household data: Def-
inition 3
Figure 12: Progression dominance for direct and payroll taxes and household data: Def-
inition 4
65Figure 13: Progression dominance for direct and payroll taxes and household data: Def-
inition 5
Figure 14: Progression dominance for direct and payroll taxes and household data: Def-
inition 6
66Figure 15: Progression dominance for direct taxes and equivalized data: Deﬁnition 1
Figure 16: Progression dominance for direct taxes and equivalized data: Deﬁnition 2
67Figure 17: Progression dominance for direct taxes and equivalized data: Deﬁnition 3
Figure 18: Progression dominance for direct taxes and equivalized data: Deﬁnition 4
68Figure 19: Progression dominance for direct taxes and equivalized data: Deﬁnition 5
Figure 20: Progression dominance for direct taxes and equivalized data: Deﬁnition 6
69Figure 21: Progression dominance for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Deﬁnition 1
Figure 22: Progression dominance for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Deﬁnition 2
70Figure 23: Progression dominance for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Deﬁnition 3
Figure 24: Progression dominance for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Deﬁnition 4
71Figure 25: Progression dominance for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Deﬁnition 5
Figure 26: Progression dominance for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Deﬁnition 6
72Figure 27: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: UK 1999 vs. US
2000
Figure 28: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data: UK
1999 vs. US 2000
73Figure 29: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: UK 1999 vs.
US 2000
Figure 30: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data: UK
1999 vs. US 2000
74Figure 31: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: Germany 2000
vs. UK 1999
Figure 32: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data:
Germany 2000 vs. UK 1999
75Figure 33: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: Germany 2000
vs. UK 1999
Figure 34: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Germany 2000 vs. UK 1999
76Figure 35: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: Germany 2000
vs. US 2000
Figure 36: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data:
Germany 2000 vs. US 2000
77Figure 37: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: Germany 2000
vs. US 2000
Figure 38: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Germany 2000 vs. US 2000
78Figure 39: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: Germany 2000
vs. Sweden 2000
Figure 40: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data:
Germany 2000 vs. Sweden 2000
79Figure 41: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: Germany 2000
vs. Sweden 2000
Figure 42: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Germany 2000 vs. Sweden 2000
80Figure 43: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: US 1991 vs. 1994
Figure 44: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data: US
1991 vs. 1994
81Figure 45: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: US 1991 vs.
1994
Figure 46: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data: US
1991 vs. 1994
82Figure 47: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: US 1994 vs. 2000
Figure 48: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data: US
1994 vs. 2000
83Figure 49: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: US 1994 vs.
2000
Figure 50: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data: US
2000 vs. 2004
84Figure 51: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: US 2000 vs. 2004
Figure 52: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data: US
2000 vs. 2004
85Figure 53: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: US 2000 vs.
2004
Figure 54: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data: US
2000 vs. 2004
86Figure 55: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: UK 1991 vs.
1995
Figure 56: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data: UK
1991 vs. 1995
87Figure 57: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: UK 1991 vs.
1995
Figure 58: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data: UK
1991 vs. 1995
88Figure 59: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: Germany 1989
vs. 1994
Figure 60: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data:
Germany 1989 vs. 1994
89Figure 61: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: Germany 1989
vs. 1994
Figure 62: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Germany 1989 vs. 1994
90Figure 63: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: Germany 1994
vs. 2000
Figure 64: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data:
Germany 1994 vs. 2000
91Figure 65: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: Germany 1994
vs. 2000
Figure 66: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Germany 1994 vs. 2000
92Figure 67: Progression comparison for direct taxes and household data: Germany 1989
vs. 2000
Figure 68: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and household data:
Germany 1989 vs. 2000
93Figure 69: Progression comparison for direct taxes and equivalized data: Germany 1989
vs. 2000
Figure 70: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and equivalized data:
Germany 1989 vs. 2000
94Figure 71: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.50: United States 1991
Figure 72: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.50: United States 1994
95Figure 73: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.25 and 0.50:
United States 2000
Figure 74: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.50: United States 2004
96Figure 75: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.50 and 0.75:
United States 1991
Figure 76: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.50
and 0.75: United States 2004
97Figure 77: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.75: United States 1994
Figure 78: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.75: United States 2000
98Figure 79: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.50: United Kingdom 1991
Figure 80: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.25 and 0.50:
United Kingdom 1999
99Figure 81: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.25 and 0.50:
United Kingdom 2004
Figure 82: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.50 and 0.75:
United Kingdom 1991
100Figure 83: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.50 and 0.75:
United Kingdom 1995
Figure 84: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.25 and 0.75:
United Kingdom 1999
101Figure 85: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.50 and 0.75:
United Kingdom 2004
Figure 86: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.75: United Kingdom 1991
102Figure 87: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.25 and 0.75:
United Kingdom 1999
Figure 88: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.75: United Kingdom 2004
103Figure 89: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.50: Germany 1989
Figure 90: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.50: Germany 1994
104Figure 91: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.50: Germany 2000
Figure 92: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.50 and 0.75:
Germany 1989
105Figure 93: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.50
and 0.75: Germany 2000
Figure 94: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.75: Germany 1989
106Figure 95: Progression comparison for direct taxes and scale parameters 0.25 and 0.75:
Germany 1994
Figure 96: Progression comparison for direct plus payroll taxes and scale parameters 0.25
and 0.75: Germany 2000
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